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Cloud computing is a multi billion dollar industry, based around outsourcing the
provisioning and maintenance of computing resources. In particular, Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS) enables customers to purchase virtual machines in order to run
arbitrary software. IaaS customers are given the option to purchase priority access,
while providers choose whether customers are preempted based on priority level. The
customer decision is based on their tolerance for preemption. However, this decision
is a reaction to the provider choice of preemption policy and cost to purchase priority.
In this work, a non-cooperative game is developed for an IaaS system offer-
ing resource reservations. An unobservable M |G|1 queue with priorities is used to
model customer arrivals and service. Customers receive a potential priority from the
provider, and choose between purchasing a reservation for that priority and accept-
ing the lowest priority for no additional cost. Customers select the option which
minimizes their total cost of waiting. This decision is based purely on statistics, as
customers cannot communicate with each other.
This work presents the impact of the provider preemption policy choice on the
cost customers will pay for a reserved instance. A provider may implement a policy in
which no customers are preempted (NP); a policy in which all customers are subject
to preemption (PR); or a policy in which only the customers not making reservations
v
are subject to preemption (HPR). It is shown that only the service load impacts the
equilibrium possibilities in the NP and PR policies, but that the service variance is
also a factor under the HPR policy. These factors impact the equilibrium possibilities
associated to a given reservation cost.
This work shows that the cost leading to a given equilibrium is greater under the
HPR policy than under the NP or PR policies, implying greater incentive to purchase
reservations. From this it is proven that a provider maximizes their potential revenue
from customer reservations under an HPR policy. It is shown that this holds in
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Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) encompasses a business model in which providers
provision computing resources on which consumers are able to deploy and run ar-
bitrary software (Mell and Grance, 2011). The IaaS model is driven by a vision
of enabling customers to have the ability to engage in tasks on lightweight, Inter-
net connected devices without the need to have a powerful desktop computer. Such
capabilities are enabled by the availability of inexpensive storage, improvements to
Internet computing software, and the wide availability of broadband and wireless
networks (Dikaiakos et al., 2009).
To this end, commercial providers such as Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine,
and Microsoft Azure who utilize this model advertise themselves as a computing plat-
form for customers to accomplish tasks such as data warehousing, high performance
computing, and application hosting (Amazon, 2019a) (Google, 2019b) (Microsoft,
2019a) eliminating the need for customers to maintain the necessary infrastructure
on their own. This allows customers to scale their capacity up or down as needed in
a flexible manner, yielding benefit in the form of cost savings through only paying
for the computing capacity currently required and not having to directly acquire and
maintain the physical computing architecture.
IaaS Cloud providers such as Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine, and Mi-
crosoft Azure are projected to reach revenues in the range of 17-44 billion USD annu-
ally by 2020 (Koetsier, 2018). As seen from these numbers, IaaS represents a lucrative
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business for the cloud computing industry. In particular, large firms such as Amazon,
Google, and Microsoft are among the major providers of cloud services. Thus, the
impact of provider and customer decisions on provider revenues are of great impor-
tance, as the potential revenue impacts informs the behavior of these firms, which in
turn affects the options made available to customers in the market.
While customers face many challenges in leveraging the IaaS model specifically or
cloud computing more generally, such as data management and privacy, user security,
and interoperability between platforms (Dikaiakos et al., 2009), the focus of this thesis
is in the area of economics within an IaaS system. In order to encourage adoption of
cloud computing, the providers must adopt a model that gives the customers incentive
to purchase computing resources, while also taking in sufficient revenue to support
the business of provisioning the computing resources to the customers. Thus, we
are interested in the questions of determining the provider’s revenue under different
pricing schemes and determining which of said schemes maximize this objective.
The pricing model employed by providers is to charge customers based upon the
usage of resources and the reservation of the resources. All customers are charged
a fee based upon the amount of storage, processing power, memory, etc. that they
use. In addition, customers are offered the option to purchase a reserved instance.
Customers purchasing a reservation pay a reservation cost in addition to any usage
charges. Alternatively, a customer may elect to forgo a reservation, only paying the
fees for the resources being used, but also having a lower priority than customers
purchasing reservations.
Generally, purchasing a reservation guarantees the customer the usage of those
resources once in service regardless of any requests pending, while customers who do
not are subject to preemption. While Google and Amazon do structure their costs in
this manner, Microsoft only offers reserved instances with costs varying based whether
3
a long-term reservation is made (Amazon, 2019b)(Google, 2019a)(Microsoft, 2019b).
We see then that variety exists in pricing implementation even among the major
providers. In addition, preempted customers may have the option to hibernate their
instances instead based on the provider implementation. Amazon and Google allow
this option to be enabled if a customer has purchased virtual storage space (Amazon,
2019c)(Google, 2019c).
As a result, customers have a choice: whether or not to purchase a reserved
instance. In some cases, customers are advised to purchase non-reserved instances
in order to save money (Chapel, 2018). This advice is based on customers using
applications which may not require persistent access to the cloud resources, and
thus are flexible in terms of completion time. One such example involves a research
organization using Google’s Cloud resources to process satellite images (McAnlis,
2017). Because the workload is not time critical, and is run in batch jobs, the use
of preemptible instances enables the job to be completed at a significant discount by
trading off the longer completion time with the lower costs of a preemptible instance
over a reserved one.
The customer’s choice, as illustrated by this example, is driven by how much
value is assigned to the time spent waiting for a job to be served. A customer is
willing to pay for a reserved instance if the cost to do so plus the cost of waiting
with reservation priority is lower than the cost of waiting with the lowest priority.
Otherwise, the customer selects a non reserved instance. However, these decisions are
based upon the cost of the reservation and the preemption policies in effect. These
are determined by the provider of the service. As a result, the customer decision is a
reaction to the provider decision. In turn, the provider’s decisions about reservation
costs and whether to preempt any, all, or some customers are based on predictions of
how the customers react to a particular cost and policy combination.
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To study the decision making processes on the parts of the customers and the
provider, we leverage techniques from game theory. Game theory is the field of study
concerning decision-making scenarios where multiple players make choices that po-
tentially affect the interests of the other players within a game (Turocy and von
Stengal, 2002). An individual game is the formal description of decisions made by
players, who are typically assumed to be rational and strategic, seeking to maximize
their own benefit based on the decisions available to them. The goal of analyzing
games is to determine whether a Nash equilibrium point exists, wherein no player
can change their strategy on their own and receive a better payoff (Turocy and von
Stengal, 2002). Quantifying the Nash equilibrium behavior, if any such equilibrium
exists, is of great benefit to the provider. If such an equilibrium exists, the provider
can leverage the knowledge of the equilibrium behavior to set a price that maximizes
the revenue intake.
We posit an uncooperative game model in order to describe the decision of pur-
chasing the reservation. In such a game, no players directly coordinate with each
other. The provider posts a reservation cost, and makes their preemption policies
publicly known. Customers then make their decisions based upon this information.
In addition, providers may provide the customer with the potential priority of their
job, which is also incorporated into the decision process. The potential priority follows
the order in which reservations are made. If the customer purchases a reservation, the
potential priority becomes their actual priority. Otherwise, the customer is assigned
the lowest possible priority.
We implicitly assume that all customers pay usage fees for their resources and that
these fees are the same for all customers whether or not the customer has purchased
a reserved instance or selected a non-reserved instance. Therefore, the customer
decision is based solely on the reservation cost and the expected wait times if making
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or not making a reservation. Because the game is uncooperative, customers do not
know how many customers are in the service queue, or how many of those have also
made a reservation. The provider meanwhile makes their decisions based on the level
of cost and the preemption policy that will lead to the greatest revenues. This decision
may be affected by the rate at which customers arrive, as well as the rate at which
they are served.
The key questions to be addressed are as follows:
• Under what circumstances will an equilibrium exist?
• If an equilibrium exists, is it unique, or are there many possible equilibria?
• How does the choice of preemption policy in the queue impact these equilibria?
• How does the rate of customer arrivals and departures impact the equilibria
possibilities?
• How does the distribution of the time spent serving customers impact the equi-
libria possibilities?
• Under which preemption policy will the provider see the maximum possible
revenue from reservation purchases?
• Under what circumstances does a provider risk seeing zero revenue when setting
the cost at the level leading to the maximum revenue (e.g., due to multiple
equilibria existing for the corresponding cost)?
Within our proposed model, we make some reducing assumptions in order to derive
insights into the decisions made by the customer and the provider. That customers are
rational and seek to maximize their own individual payoff is considered to be common
knowledge among the players (Turocy and von Stengal, 2002). In addition, we assume
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that the customers are statistically identical, which is a standard assumption under
Naor’s model (Hassin and Haviv, 2003, Ch. 3). Our game model streamlines the
decision between instance types to consider only reserved and on-reserved instances.
This enables the model to capture the decision to purchase a reservation over a non
reserved instance. As part of the reservation system, we assume that the provider
assigns a potential priority to customers. If the cost of the time spent waiting for
service at this priority plus the reservation fee cost is less than the cost of the time
spent waiting for service at the lowest priority, the customer purchases a reserved
instance. Otherwise, the customer chooses a non-reserved instance.
The provider selects a cost C > 0 to purchase a reservation, and implements one
of three preemption policies:
• Non preemptive (NP) - no customer is preempted once in service, regardless of
whether they purchased a reserved instance or not.
• Preemptive resume (PR) - all customers are subject to preemption while in
service by the arrival of higher priority customers. Preempted customers resume
service from the point of interruption.
• Hybrid preemptive /non preemptive (HPR) - customers purchasing reserved
instances are not preempted once in service. Those who do not are subject to
PR behavior, and are preempted if a customer with a reservation arrives. This
reflects the current policy adopted by Amazon and Google.
For reasons of tractability, we model the system as an M |G|1 queue. That is, we
have customer arrivals that follow a Poisson process, and a general service distribution
with a single server. Which preemption policy to select, and the attendant cost for
reservations, in order to maximize the provider’s revenue is dependent on the service-
related parameters of the service queue itself. Particularly, we are concerned with
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the mean arrival rate of customers, the mean service rate, and the variance of service
times. The following parameters are used to describe these characteristics:
• X - A random variable used to describe the possible service times.
• λ - The mean rate of arrivals to the queue.
• µ - The mean rate of service, defined such that E[X] = 1
µ
.
• ρ - The system load, defined such that ρ = λ
µ
.
• K - The service variance parameter, defined such that E[X2] = K
µ2
. By conse-
quence, the variance becomes E[X2]− E[X]2 = K−1
µ2
.
In our model, we assume the system is stable, i.e. the rate of arrivals does not
outpace the rate of service. In terms of the parameters, this results in ρ < 1. In
general, we find that the closer in value ρ is to 1, the more likely it is that the
increased number of customers present in the queue will result in multiple equilibria.
Further, we find that while the value of K impacts the cost under the NP and PR
policies, it ultimately does not impact the equilibrium behavior. However, in an HPR
policy, K does impact the equilibrium possibilities.
If a customer is being preempted, they at minimum have the full service time of
the newly arriving customer added to their waiting time, as the preemption results in
the customer in service going back into the queue, unable to reenter until all higher
priority customers are served. Conversely, the newly arriving customer saves a wait
time equal to the residual service of the customer who was preempted. The difference
between these values becomes part of the consideration as to whether to pay to
purchase priority in the HPR case as it is a decision between being paying to avoid
preemption or accepting the possibility of additional wait time due to preemption.
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Under the assumptions and the decisions available to the provider and the cus-
tomers, our main contributions under this model are to formally prove the following
results:
• The only type of equilibrium that is possible, regardless of the provider’s choice
of preemption policy, is a threshold equilibrium based on customer priorities.
All customers with potential priority greater than the threshold will choose to
purchase a reservation, and all customers with potential priority lower than the
threshold will not purchase a reservation.
• Equilibrium states where all customers opt to purchase a reserved instance are
possible only when the HPR preemption policy is in effect.
• For fixed values of ρ andK, the cost C leading to a specific equilibrium threshold
is greater under the HPR policy than the NP or PR policies.
• If the provider implements a NP or a PR preemption policy, the possible equi-
librium types depend only on the system load ρ (i.e., it only depends on the
first moments of the inter-arrival distribution and the service distribution and
not on higher moments).
• Conversely, in the HPR policy, the possible equilibrium types also depend on the
value of K (i.e. they depend on the second moment of the service distribution).
• A rational provider will opt to implement the HPR policy, as the maximum
possible revenue which can be obtained in this policy will be greater than that
under the NP or PR policies for all values of K and ρ.
A reservation cost C can result in multiple equilibrium points depending on the
values of K and ρ, and the preemption policy in effect. In the case where the cost lead-
ing to a provider’s maximum revenue corresponds to multiple equilibria, determining
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whether the maximum revenue is achievable is a non-trivial problem. In particular,
if multiple equilibria are present, not all of them are necessarily stable. The provider
cannot guarantee that an unstable equilibrium will be reached.
As this can result in a provider achieving zero revenue from reservations, if the
value of ρ and K result in a cost leading to the maximum revenue being associated
to multiple equilibria, the provider has an additional choice. To attempt to acquire
the maximum possible revenue despite the unstable equilibrium, or to lower the cost
to a level where a unique equilibrium is reached. A provider seeking to guarantee
revenue collection from reservations will choose the latter approach. We numerically
demonstrate the following with respect to the guaranteed revenue:
• A provider maximizing their guaranteed revenue should implement an HPR
preemption policy in order achieve maximum revenue subject to the constraint
of the cost being in a region with a unique equilibrium.
• If the HPR policy is in effect, and K ≤ 2, an equilibrium in which all cus-
tomers purchase a reservation is the only equilibrium type which will result in
maximizing the guaranteed revenue, no matter the value of the system load ρ.
• If the HPR policy is in effect, and K > 2, whether the the guaranteed revenue
occurs at a point in which all customers purchase a reservation is dependent on
the value of ρ.
In Chapter 2, we examine prior work in the areas of queuing games, preemption
based systems, and pricing within cloud computing ecosystems. We evaluate how
these works relate to and influence our model, as well as how our work differs from
these works. In particular, studies of cloud pricing in prior works tend to ignore
the reservation decision and rather focus on competition between providers or price
auctions for non reserved instances. Additionally, prior works in the realm of advanced
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reservation that we build upon focus only on the customer decision, even though the
provider has the ability to vary the preemption policy to suit their needs which in
turn affects the customer’s final decision of reserving or not reserving.
In Chapter 3, we explicitly define our model and prove that under our assumptions
the only equilibrium type that is possible is a threshold equilibrium. Given this, we
then derive the means to determine the cost C(φ) leading to an equilibrium with a
threshold of φ ∈ [0, 1], for each of the preemption policies. Within each policy, we
derive explicit expressions for the maximum and minimum values of the cost function.
Using these expressions and the values of C(0) and C(1), we determine the values of ρ
and K which define regions of costs for which equilibria where all customers reserve,
some customers reserve, and no customers reserve exist. These ranges also define
regions where an equilibrium is unique and where multiple equilibria are possible.
In Chapter 4, we derive the revenue for each preemption policy, and determine the
conditions under which providers obtain the maximum possible revenue and derive
an expression for it. In addition, we determine the costs for which the the max-
imum possible revenue is associated to a cost which coincides with other possible
equilibrium types. For such cases, we also derive an expression for the maximum
guaranteed revenue. With the expressions derived, we compare the maximum rev-
enue and maximum guaranteed revenue across preemption policies to determine the
conditions under which a provider should select a particular preemption policy. From
these comparisons, we prove that a strategic provider should always select a HPR
policy if a provider is purely revenue maximizing. If a provider is willing to settle for





In this chapter, we present an overview of related works in the areas of preemption
based systems, cloud computing pricing, and game theory with an emphasis on queu-
ing games for the latter. Following this overview, we compare the results from these
related works to our contributions which follow in Chapters 3 and 4. We stress the
novel, distinct contributions of this thesis in this regard.
2.1 Priority and Preemption Based Systems
The foundation of the IaaS provider behavior is built upon the notion of assigning
priorities to customers based upon their reservation decision, as well as the decision
to preempt certain lower priority customers. The behavior of systems under priority,
with or without preemption, is a common concern in the literature. While this has
implications within the context of queuing games as seen in Section 2.3.1 below, other
studies of preemption systems consider situations where the preemptions were due to
service interruptions and not necessarily correlated with customer priorities (Gaver,
1962).
In the classic book (Conway et al., 1967, Chapter 8) an entire chapter is devoted to
deriving formulas for the waiting time and total system flow times of M |G|1 systems
incorporating priority, both preemptive and non preemptive in nature. In that book,
the formulation is presented in the context of manufacturing processes based on which
products were considered to have higher priority. (Conway et al., 1967, Ch. 8) alludes
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to a basic goal of introducing deliberate preemption mechanisms based upon priority:
to improve the quality of service of the entire system by ensuring that higher priority
tasks are completed more quickly. While this overall improvement may come at the
expense of tasks with the lowest priority, the emphasis is on performance across all
priorities rather than the performance of a single priority class.
Within non IaaS contexts, commercial services exist that tout this preemption
as a benefit. For example, Two Sigma’s Cook scheduler divides jobs into batch and
interactive, and will preempt batch jobs in favor of prioritizing interactive jobs (Jin,
2016). Per Two Sigma’s benchmarks, the purported benefit of using their scheduler
that this preemption results in low latency with high throughput, thus resulting in
a net benefit to the system (Jin, 2016). While the source in question is essentially
an advertisement from Two Sigma, it is nonetheless an example of the perceived
benefits of preemption and the importance of using this as a selling point to potential
customers.
There exist multiple types of preemption. A preemptive repeat system is one in
which a process must restart from the beginning if preempted at any point in service.
In contrast, a preemptive resume system is one in which a preempted process resumes
from the point of interruption when it next enters service. Both preemption types are
seen in various contexts, with the justification depending on the type of interruption.
For instance, it may be appropriate to model interruptions in service due to break
downs as a preemptive repeat system, since a breakdown can result in progress being
lost. An example of such a system is found in (Gaver, 1962). However, instead of
breakdowns, preemptive repeat behavior can be a deliberate choice within a multi-
purpose server to force customers to restart service if preempted by a higher priority
customer (Avi-Itzhak, 1963). In the IaaS context, this is achieved by simply not
saving the VM state of preempted instances. A preempted customer who did not
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save their data locally would be forced to restart from the beginning when they are
next able to launch a VM on the cloud infrastructure. However, not only does such a
system suffer from a lack of tractability due to being non work-conserving, in practice
it is often possible to save a VM state in a situation where preemption is deliberate.
A situation in which saved VM states for preempted customers are indeed kept
can be considered to match a preemptive resume system. (Conway et al., 1967, Ch. 8)
derives formulas for the preemptive resume case, as well as the non preemptive version.
However, these formulas implicitly assume a discrete assignment of priorities. In a
cloud system, where the number of customers is inherently stochastic and unknowable
to the provider in advance prior to the commencing service, it is likely that any priority
assignment must be drawn from a continuum of potential priorities.
Such a preemptive resume system with infinite priorities drawn from the uniform
distribution U [0, 1] is considered in an M |M |1 queue in (Master et al., 2017). That
is, a single server queue with arrivals following a Poisson process and service times
which are exponentially distributed. The paper shows that the expected wait times
for customers in the queue under a continuum of priorities is identical to what would
be derived from the formula contained in (Conway et al., 1967, ch.8) for an M |M |1
queue in the discrete setting (Master et al., 2017). Thus, the principles first derived
in (Conway et al., 1967, ch.8) can be shown to hold regardless of whether the number
of priority classes is discrete or drawn from a uniform distribution.
In addition to the above, however, we know that there exist IaaS providers who
preempt some customers but not all. This naturally impacts customer wait times in a
different manner than a regular preemptive resume or preemptive repeat system. The
question of priority scheduling in a hybrid preemptive/non-preemptive environment
is considered in the context of a train network segment where only one train can be
operating at any given time in (Fatnes, 2010). This thesis models trains operating
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along single track paths as an M |D|1 queuing system; arrivals follow a Poisson pro-
cess, and service times are deterministic. (Fatnes, 2010) determines that under this
priority model, the expected total system flow time in each class can be derived from
the processing time of a single customer in the class and interruptions from higher
priority customers. Thus, the system flow time in a queue utilizing a hybrid preemp-
tion structure can be derived using the same techniques used to describe flow time in
a queue with all customers being subject to the same preemption policies.
2.2 Cloud Computing Pricing
In addition to the preemption and priority behavior, the provider’s pricing strategy is
another important consideration in an IaaS system. The question of the appropriate
level to set a price by a cloud provider is a topic that is considered under multiple
contexts. (Xu and Li, 2013) considers pricing under the pay-as-you-go model with
the provider choosing between resource throttling and performance guarantee service
models with a monopolistic provider, but ignoring preemption effects. (Niu et al.,
2012) is concerned with models in which customers are able to reserve a guaranteed
minimum bandwidth through payment of a reservation fee in addition to pay-as-you-
go fees from actual service. However, this paper focuses on solving the issue of what
price leads to a socially optimal outcome as opposed to analyzing the impacts of pre-
emption on the cost. (Menache et al., 2011) focuses on determining a socially optimal
pricing model. While it assumes heterogeneous customers, preemption of customers
is not considered under the version of the pay-as-you-go model under consideration.
This highlights a common theme in the study of cloud pricing, an emphasis on the
social optimal point. While such a viewpoint is sensible given the increasing ubiquity
of cloud computing as highlighted in (Dikaiakos et al., 2009), the models do not
consider preemption as a primary focus. Instead, the decision typically considered
15
is the join or balk decision, where customers determine whether to join the queue
in the first place. Even in works studying resource allocation policies, preemption
is not a primary consideration. For example, (Nathani et al., 2012) is based around
policies where tasks can be rescheduled if necessary, but not preempted. Instead,
tasks are associated to leases which are scheduled in order to fit all lease requests as
new requests come in. If the new lease cannot be scheduled it is dropped. Similarly,
(Psychas and Ghaderi, 2018) explicitly focuses on non preemptive scheduling in cloud
systems. Such studies reflect the variety of possible scheduling techniques possible
in a cloud environment, but do not reflect the process implemented by the major
commercial IaaS providers.
Even in studies of pricing that incorporate the existence of preemptible instances,
the focus is on competition for those resources specifically rather than the decision
of which instance type to purchase. For example (Javadi et al., 2011) focuses on
modeling the prices of Amazon EC2 spot instances based on demand and available idle
resources. While the availability of spot instances depends on reservation decisions
made by others, the impact of the customer reservation decision is only considered
in so far as it reduces the resources available to customers who wish to purchase.
Similarly, the study in (Sharma et al., 2017) considers management of spare resources
independent of the customer decision. The consideration in (Van den Bossche et al.,
2010) of minimum cost scheduling of jobs in hybrid public/private clouds assumes
that jobs cannot migrate instances, which implicitly assumes that preemption cannot
occur.
Meanwhile, while (Li et al., 2014) mentions the existence of spot instances in its
abstract, the actual analysis concerns itself with a competition in a duopoly market
wherein each provider sets a single price, thus implicitly ignoring the possibility of
different classes of service within each provider. This paper is another example of the
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preemption decision being ignored. Even in works where the existence of preemptible
instances are acknowledged, such as (Javadi et al., 2011) and (Li et al., 2014), the
decision of which instance type to purchase is not taken into consideration.
The other recurring theme in the literature are studies of posted prices versus en-
abling customer auctions. (Zhang et al., 2017) centers on optimizing the price to be
charged in a situation where the provider publishes the price per resource type, and
customers can either purchase the resource and run their job, or refuse the resources
and exit immediately. While the study does consider multiple resource types, pre-
emption impacts on the pricing model are not explicitly studied. In contrast, (Zhang
et al., 2015) considers a model in which the customers are explicitly placing bids for
service based upon their valuation, but again preemption is not considered, with the
auction based on the desired service time and resources. Thus again, preemption
effects are not a consideration in the pricing.
2.3 Game Theory
As noted in the introduction, game theory is the study of decision making where
players must make decisions which potentially affect the interests of other players
(Turocy and von Stengal, 2002). The goal in studying games is to determine the
existence of a Nash equilibrium point, whereby no players may improve their benefit
through unilaterally changing their strategy (Turocy and von Stengal, 2002). Game
theory has its roots within the field of economics through the work of von Neumann,
Morgenstern, and Nash but as it is a study of decision making it has come to be
applied to a variety of fields. In particular, Maynard Smith pioneered the use of
game theory to study evolutionary behavior by evaluating the success of adopting a
given strategy in a conflict, which in turn drives evolutionary behavior.
Specifically, (Smith and Price, 1973) introduces the concept of the evolutionary
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stable strategy (ESS). A strategy is ESS if for a game with multiple realizations, there
does not exist a countering strategy which is a better response in the next and future
realizations. The stability of equilibria is an important consideration if the same
condition leads to multiple equilibria possibilities. An equilibrium which is stable
is not necessarily optimal in either the social sense or maximizing a monopolistic
provider’s revenue.
Game theoretic approaches have also been applied to information systems (Turocy
and von Stengal, 2002). Indeed, queuing games as discussed in the below subsection
are a specific subset of games studying customer behavior in deciding to join queues
with certain priorities. These queues can and are be used to model customers at-
tempting to join cloud systems. Examples of games being used to model competition
for non preemptive resources are contained in (Reddyvari Raja et al., 2016), (Jebalia
et al., 2013), and (Liu et al., 2016). While these games establish Nash equilibria in
situations where users are competing for cloud resources or compare game types in or-
der to evaluate differences in fairness and other factors and their impact on equilibria,
they do not consider the preemption impact of the customer decision profile.
2.3.1 Queuing Games
Queuing games are a specific set of game which applies game theoretic concepts
to queuing systems. As with any other game, the goal of analyzing such games
is to determine the possible equilibrium states based upon the interplay of customer
actions and reactions to decisions by the server providers. The earliest known attempt
to quantify these behaviors comes from Naor’s work, which contains a model for an
unobservable queue as cited in (Hassin and Haviv, 2003, Ch. 3):
1. A stationary Poisson stream of customers - with parameter λ - arrives to a
single server facility.
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2. The service times are independent, identically, and exponentially distributed
with parameter µ.
3. A customer’s benefit from completed service is R
4. The cost to a customer for staying in the system (either while waiting or while
being served) is C per unit of time.
5. Customers are risk neutral, that is, they maximize the expected value of their
net benefit.
6. Utility functions of individual customers are identically and additive, from the
public (social) point of view.
7. Rµ ≥ C - otherwise all customers would refuse to join the queue.
8. The service discipline is strong and work-conserving.
9. A decision to join is irrevocable, and reneging is not allowed.
10. At the time a customer’s need for service arises, he irrevocably either joins the
queue of balks. It is not possible to observe the queue length before making
this decision.
This model serves as the foundation for further studies of customer behavior within
queues. For example, (Haviv, 2011) shows that if customers are given the option to
upgrade to a premium class, assuming Naor’s unobservable queue model, customers
will behave in a Follow the Crowd pattern. The more customers who decide to
purchase the upgrade, the more valuable that upgraded priority is, which in turn
results in increasing incentive for subsequent customers to also purchase the upgrade.
Depending on the added value from priority, there will either be a single equilibrium
where everyone purchases the upgrade, a single equilibrium where no one purchases
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the upgrade, or multiple equilibria. In the latter case, there exists one equilibrium
of each of the pure pure types with all customers making the same decision, and
one where some fraction of customers purchase priority and the remainder do not.
This last equilibrium can be shown to be unstable in the ESS sense depending on the
strategy leading to the mixed equilibrium (Hassin and Haviv, 2003, p. 81).
(Edelson and Hilderbrand, 1975) analyzes the relation between congestion tolls
which are socially optimal, and those which are revenue maximizing. Building from
Naor’s model, customers pay a congestion toll θ if they wish to join the queue, and
make this decision based upon the relation between the toll plus the expected cost
of waiting, and the benefit from service. The work finds that the toll leading to the
socially optimal and revenue maximizing outcomes are not necessarily the same if
customers do not all share the same value for waiting time (Edelson and Hilderbrand,
1975). Other works build on this result to determine whether information about
the queue should be suppressed in order to prevent customers from balking and not
joining the queue in the first place (Hassin, 1986). Generally, it is better for the
provider to conceal information about the queue, reinforcing the use of Naor’s model
for the unobservable case (Simhon and Starobinski, 2017).
The fifth assumption in the model, that customers maximize their expected value,
is typically interpreted to mean that customers are selfish. As customers do not
cooperate, a specific customer’s decision takes the impact of prior customer decisions
into account, but any negative externalities on future customers are not considered.
Selfish behavior is a key aspect of the analysis in (Shenker, 1994). This paper defends
the selfish approach, despite it not leading to optimally efficient Nash equilibria,
because the cooperative approach requires customers to both know their utilities in
the abstract, as well as require advance agreement on what it means to cooperate in
the first place.
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Within the networking context (Shenker, 1994) studies, preferences can not be
specified a priori, but rather network controls are optimized based upon the actual
resource allocation, a process that is inherently selfish. In addition, a selfish model
is reasonable as the large and unknown number of customers of a service results in
attempts at coordination to be impractical. This is especially the case if the provider
does not provide information on which customers have already attempted to purchase
resource use. In this situation, the provider would not supply a means for customers
to communicate with each other, so some external channel would have to exist.
Regardless, for the model studied in (Shenker, 1994) Nash equilibria states are
reachable. Thus, selfishness should not necessarily be taken to be a negative due to
the uncooperative nature of these games. As a result, we can justify the use of an
uncooperative game model featuring an unobservable queue. And as noted above,
(Haviv, 2011) features a game where the more customers who upgrade to a premium
class of service exist, the more incentive exists to purchase the upgraded service.
These concepts are further refined in games which incorporate advance reservation
(AR) structures into the customer decision making process.
As noted in the Introduction, IaaS providers do charge for reservations, hence the
desire to study behavior within reservation based systems. Within the AR model,
customers are given the option to pay a fee ahead of time in order to increase their
chances of gaining service at their desired time. Under the assumption of the model
as presented in (Simhon and Starobinski, 2017), customers desiring service have the
choice to make AR or not make AR, and will be charged a service fee regardless.
Therefore, a provider’s profit maximization motive depends upon the reservation
cost charged for customers making AR. In (Simhon and Starobinski, 2018), this is
explicitly shown for an M |D|1 queue with preemption, deriving a formula for the
revenue based on the cost leading to a given equilibrium point. The equilibrium in
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turn is derived from the wait time formulas for a customer in a M |D|1 queue with
preemptive resume behavior. (Simhon and Starobinski, 2018) utilizes concepts similar
those from (Haviv, 2011), except that in the model from the latter work there are only
two classes of customers: one of regular customers and one of premium customers.
In (Simhon and Starobinski, 2018) there is more than one AR class. As a result,
the classes are drawn from a continuum of priorities, and the equilibrium is based on
comparison to a threshold priority φ. The cost that results in a threshold φ is the
difference between wait time with priority φ and priority 0, the lowest possible. In
particular, this structure results in no equilibrium existing where all customers will
choose to make an AR. In such a scenario, φ would be equal to 0. In turn, the cost
would be equal to 0 and this results to a 0 revenue situation for the provider.
2.4 Summary and Comparisons to Our Results
Applicability to cloud computing infrastructure is explicitly cited as a reason to
study the AR games referenced in the previous section (Simhon and Starobinski,
2017)(Simhon and Starobinski, 2018). Indeed, the models used in these papers take
priority and reservation cost into effect. Based upon what we know about the pricing
models used by the real world IaaS providers as well as the works in the areas of pre-
emption systems and cloud computing pricing, AR games can be considered a natural
extension of the study into strategic behavior of both customers and providers. Our
model in Chapter 3 builds upon prior works in AR such as those in (Simhon and
Starobinski, 2018), (Simhon and Starobinski, 2017), and (Simhon and Starobinski,
2016) which are themselves built upon the priority systems based upon those studied
in (Conway et al., 1967) and modeled using queues with the assumptions of Naor’s
model (Hassin and Haviv, 2003, Ch.3). However a key difference between those works
and ours is on the decision making focus. The model is ultimately based on the cus-
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tomer decision to purchase a reservation or not. Yet, (Simhon and Starobinski, 2018)
and (Simhon and Starobinski, 2017) in particular assume that there is no relation
between the reservation purchase and eligibility for preemption. Either all customers
are subject to preemption once in service, or none of them are.
This is not indicative of the pricing model leveraged by the major commercial
IaaS providers. Some customer classes are subject to preemption, and some are not.
And subjection to preemption is based on the reservation decision by the customer.
The provider decision of the preemption policy to implement is ignored in these prior
works. As this preemption policy is fully under the provider’s control, a focus of our
work is to show the impact of the preemption policies on the revenue that is seen by
the provider. We prove that a hybrid preemptive/non-preemptive policy will lead to
the greatest possible revenue for the provider and therefore is the policy that a rational
provider should implement. And we show that this holds within an M |G|1 queue,
rather than the M |D|1 of (Simhon and Starobinski, 2018) or M |M |1 of (Simhon and
Starobinski, 2017).
While our model does incorporate priorities assigned from a continuum as well as a
hybrid preemption policy, that we can adapt the formulas from (Conway et al., 1967)
to describe customer behavior in our model follows from the work in (Master et al.,
2017) and (Fatnes, 2010). As a result, we have a tractable analysis of the decision
faced by IaaS providers, enabling comparisons of how the providers fare under each
preemption policy.
The other major contribution of our model is to provide an analysis of customer
behavior subject to the preemption policy instituted by the provider. Rather than
auction as in (Zhang et al., 2015), the prices are fixed and known to the customers.
However, unlike the related works in cloud pricing as reviewed in Section 2.2, the
focus is in our model on the customer decision to purchase a reserved instance over
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a non-reserved instance. This is in contrast to the related works which either ignore
the reservation decision completely, or focus on the behavior of a class of customers
who have already made the decision.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium Analysis for a Single Server
Model
In this chapter, we define the queuing game that the customers and the provider play.
This game is structured around the customer decision of whether or not to purchase a
reserved instance, and the provider’s choice of the cost to purchase a reserved instance.
Our objective is to determine how the possible Nash equilibria are impacted by the
service load, distribution of service times, the cost set by the provider to purchase a
reserved instance, and the provider’s decision of whether to preempt lower priority
customers.
In Section 3.1 we introduce the game definition. For reasons of tractability we
consider the single server case, as explicit formulas exist for wait time in the queue
as noted in (Conway et al., 1967). In turn, this enables the derivation of an explicit
formula for the cost in terms of the difference in wait times at the lowest priority,
and at a purchased priority. We prove that the only equilibrium type that arises is a
threshold equilibrium. From this we prove the conditions under which all customers
will purchase a reservation, no customers will purchase a reservation, or some fraction
of customers corresponding to a threshold φ purchase a reservation.
In Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 we derive explicit, closed-form formulas for the cost
leading to the equilibrium threshold φ, and determine the conditions under which
equilibrium possibilities exist. Under the NP and PR policies, we find that the equi-
librium types depend only on the service load ρ, and that the conditions for a partic-
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ular equilibrium type are identical in both policies. Under the HPR policy, we prove
that the equilibrium possibilities also depend on K, a parameter corresponding to
the second moment of service. Moreover, for any fixed values of K and ρ, the cost
leading to threshold φ is higher under HPR than it is under NP or PR.
In Section 3.5, we provide simulations under each policy in order to validate the
results from the previous sections.
3.1 Game Definition
The objective of the game model is to capture the effects of a specific customer deci-
sion: whether to pay the cost C to purchase a reserved instance, or forgo the cost but
be subject to the lowest priority. In order to analyze the decision, we work to isolate
it. We begin with the assumptions from Naor’s Model for an unobservable queue
(Hassin and Haviv, 2003, pp 21- 45), as noted in Section 2.3.1. The unobservable
queue results in an uncooperative game where no customers are in communication
with any other customer, which is a reasonable assumption for purchasers of a cloud
service.
For reasons of tractability, we consider a system modeled by an M |G|1 queue.
Naor’s Model specifies the arrival of customers follows a Poisson process, which the
M |G|1 specifies. The assumption of a general distribution enables proofs of state-
ments for all service cases, and not merely special cases such as the M |D|1 or M |M |1
queues. In addition, the single server case enables explicit formulas to be derived for
the reservation costs, something which is not possible in general for the multi-server
cases. In turn, the explicit formulas drive insight into the customer behavior.
In particular, we assume that the customers are statistically identical. Manage-
ment of virtual infrastructure dictates that cloud services provide a uniform and
homogeneous view of the virtualized resources (Sotomayor et al., 2009). While this
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requirement is stated in reference to private or hybrid public/private clouds, it is done
in the context of requirements to provide users in such cloud environments with the
same features as commercial IaaS clouds. Therefore, we use this as justification for
customers being statistically identical, as the VMs being provisioned run on resources
considered to be homogeneous.
In addition, the provider has the option to implement preemption for some or
all customers based on an assigned priority class. Because Amazon EC2 and Google
feature the option to allow preempted customers to hibernate their instances if they
have purchased virtual storage (Amazon, 2019c)(Google, 2019c), we incorporate the
assumption that if a customer is preempted they resume from the point of interruption
upon reentry. While a provider could also force a preempted customer to completely
restart their service, our simplifying assumption enables analysis of a particular use
case which is relatively common. For our purposes we assume all customers already
have virtual storage purchased in order to store the results of their computations on
the cloud.
Further, we assume that while there is a service fee charged to customers who are
actively being served, that this fee is the same for all customers. We also assume
that all customers entering the queue will seek service, i.e. they do not balk or
renege due to the service fee. Because the reservation decision has no impact on the
service fee, the customer choice depends entirely on C and the costs of waiting with
or without a reservation. Similarly, the provider decision to set the preemption policy
and reservation cost C are the only factors that impact the revenue collected. All
customers in the queue will pay the service fee regardless, and any customer in the
queue will enter service, so altering C does not impact the revenue collected from
customers in service. As a result, maximizing revenue from reservations maximizes
the provider’s overall revenue.
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Finally, we consider a system in which reservations are allowed in advance of a
service block commencing. This is essentially an adaptation of the advance reser-
vation (AR) game from (Simhon and Starobinski, 2018) incorporating the provider
preemption policy decision into the analysis. Customers generally know in advance
if and when they will require use of the service. An AR model enables a customer to
make the reservation when it is realized that service will required at a future time.
Thus, customers make their reservation decision at that point, and the provider can
use the AR to plan out resource usage. This is especially important given the other
assumption of a single server case. Further, the customers’ decision is based entirely
on the reservation fee and the difference in wait times to enter service. In the case
of a large scale provider, this will largely be based on how much time the customer
is willing to spend waiting if high demand for service results in preemption as the
number of servers is not infinite. Therefore, an AR single server model is still able
to capture the decision of reserve or not reserve within the cloud service, and thus
we are justified in building our model out from it. Finally, we assume that the time
spent preempting one customer for another is negligible due to the ability to swap
out predefined VMs for customers being served.
Table 3.1 contains the notation that will be used in describing the game and the
associated wait times and costs. The justification of K ≥ 1 comes from the definition
of the variance, which in terms of our variables will be K−1
µ2
. Since the variance cannot
be less than zero, and the first moment of service is always 1
µ
by definition, K ≥ 1
follows.
We assume WLOG that the potential priority parameter p̂ is drawn from the
uniform distribution over [0, 1], which follows from the probability integral transfor-
mation theorem, which states that any continuous distribution can be converted to a
random variable with uniform distribution (Dodge, 2003). Because of this, we take
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Table 3.1: Definitions of notations utilized to describe the game
Notation Definition
RI The customer action to purchase a Reserved Instance.
NRI The customer action to select a Non-Reserved Instance.
p̂ Potential priority of a customer prior to reservation decision. p̂ is drawn
from the distribution U [0, 1].
p Actual priority of a customer following reservation decision. p = p̂ if the
customer purchases a reservation, and p = 0 otherwise.
φ Threshold priority for making a reservation. The customer decision will
be based upon whether p̂ is greater than or less than φ.
λ The mean customer arrival rate for all classes combined.
λp The mean arrival rate customers of priority p.
λa The mean arrival rate of customers with higher priority than p.
λb The mean arrival rate of customers with lower priority than p.
X Random variable describing the possible service times of customers.
µ The mean service rate for all classes, where E[X] = 1
µ
.
ρ The total system load, equal toλ
µ
. We assume a stable system, therefore
ρ ∈ (0, 1); that is, arrival rate does not exceed service rate.
K The variance in service parameter, where the second moment of service
E[X2] = K
µ2
. We define K such that K ≥ 1.
C The cost set by the provider. By assumption, C > 0, otherwise a provider
cannot collect positive revenue.
the priority to correspond to the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function
(CCDF) of the reservation decision times.
The resulting game has the following structure:
• Customers realize prior to the start of a service block that service is desired at
some future time t > 0.
• Reservations are not allowed once the service period has begun at time t = 0.
• The inter-arrival times are distributed exponentially with parameter λ. Note:
we use arrival to refer to the event of a customer entering the service queue,
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rather than the event of a customer making their reservation decision.
• Customers are assigned potential priority p̂ by the provider based on when they
make their reservation decision.
• The priority is drawn from the CCDF of the reservation period times: 1 is the
highest possible potential priority, and 0 is the lowest.
• Customers are presented with the cost C > 0 to make a reservation.
• Customers do not know the queue size or who else has already chosen RI or
NRI when making the decision, but do know the values of λ, µ, and K.
• If the customer chooses the Reserved Instance action (RI), they pay C and are
assigned priority p = p̂.
• If the customer chooses the Non-Reserved Instance action (NRI), they do not
pay C and are assigned priority p = 0.
Depending on how the provider establishes the system, customers in the RI and
NRI classes may or may not be preempted. This gives rise to the following possible
policies:
1. Non Preemptive (NP) queue: Both RI and NRI customers are not preempted.
2. Preemptive Resume (PR) queue: Both RI and NRI customers are preempted
and resume from the point of interruption.
3. Hybrid Preemptive/Non Preemptive (HPR) queue: RI customers are not pre-
empted, but NRI customers are preempted and resume at point of interruption.
Figure 3·1 illustrates an example of this game with an M |M |1 server, that is a
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Figure 3·1: Example of a M |M |1-PR Reservation Game with four
customers: 1,2,3, and 4, labeled in order of when they made their
reservation decision (r.d). 1 and 2 choose RI, 3 and 4 choose NRI.
The four customers have a requested start (r.s) order of 4,1,3,2. The
service period begins at Time 0, and customers are served by priority
and requested start time, subject to preemption by higher priority cus-
tomers. The numbers above the axis within the Service Period indicate
the customer currently in service.
server implements a PR service policy. There are four customers in this game: cus-
tomers 1 and 2 who choose RI in that order, and customers 3 and 4 who choose NRI.
Because customer 4 requests the earliest service start, they enter service despite hav-
ing priority 0. Customer 4 is still in service when customer 1’s requested service start
occurs, so customer 4 is preempted. Customers 2 and 3 both have requested service
starts during customer 1’s service time, and thus must wait in the queue as customer
1 has the highest priority. After customer 1 exits, customer 2 has higher priority than
the other customers due to choosing RI, and so begins their service. After customer
2 exits, the only remaining customers both have 0 priority as they chose NRI. Since
customer 4 had the earlier requested service start, customer 4 is allowed to reenter
to complete their service. Customer 3 then enters once customer 4 has completed
service.
3.1.1 Equilibrium Strategies
With the game definition in place, we turn our attention to determining the conditions
under which equilibrium states exist in this queuing game. A Nash equilibrium exists
when no player can unilaterally change their strategy to gain a better payoff (Turocy
and von Stengal, 2002). As the only possible actions available to the customer are
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RI and NRI, the candidates for equilibrium behavior in our game are the following:
1. All − reserve: all customers entering the queue opt to choose RI.
2. None− reserve: no customer entering the queue opts to choose RI.
3. Some−reserve: customers adopt a mixed strategy, where customers will choose
RI with some probability and NRI otherwise.
Under our assumptions, customers are rational, and will only choose RI if incentive
exists to pay C to reduce waiting time in the queue. Further, within our model
customers are statistically identical, therefore all customers incur the same cost per
time unit of waiting. Denote this cost per time unit as α. As α is a cost imposed on
the customer, α > 0 follows.
As customers are statistically identical we consider all customers to have symmet-
ric behavior. Therefore the decision of RI or NRI will depend only on the value of the
potential priority p̂ and the cost C imposed by the provider. Define σ(p̂) to be the
strategy function mapping the potential priority p̂ to the choice of RI or NRI with
some probability. Define W (σ(p̂), p̂) to be the expected time waiting in the queue for
service of a customer following strategy σ(p̂) and potential priority p̂. As customers
behave strategically, they will choose the action which incurs the least cost to them.
The action choice will be based upon the statistical information from the expected
wait time. Thus, for a customer with potential priority p̂ to choose RI, the following
must hold:
αW (RI, p̂) + C ≤ αW (NRI, p̂). (3.1)
Because α is identical for all customers, and is a constant multiple of the wait
time functions, we will consider the normalized cost derived by dividing both sides of
(3.1) by α:
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W (RI, p̂) +
C
α
≤ W (NRI, p̂).
For the remainder of this thesis, references to the cost of reservation will be to the
normalized cost, including the value of C.
A customer can never have a shorter expected wait time than a customer who
has higher priority. Otherwise, this implies that a customer with lower priority can
obtain service prior to a higher priority customer in the queue. Further, all customers
will follow the same strategy due to symmetric behavior. This leads to the following
Definition and Lemma.
Definition 1. A threshold strategy is a strategy where there is some φ ∈ [0, 1] such
that the strategy function σ(p̂) takes the following form:
σ(p̂) =

RI if p̂ > φ
NRI if p̂ ≤ φ.
Lemma 1. Under this game model, at equilibrium, all customers follow a threshold
strategy.
The proof adapts the technique of the proof for the similar Lemma 4.4 in (Simhon
and Starobinski, 2017) to our model.
Proof. Consider a customer making the decision of which action to take at p̂ ∈ [0, 1].
Customers in our model are statistically identical and therefore have the same benefit
from service. Thus, the total utility for a customer depends on the cost of waiting.
For a RI customer, this cost is W (RI, p̂) + C, and for a NRI customer the cost is
W (NRI, p̂). Since all customers choosing NRI have the same service priority, the
expected wait time does not depend on p̂. Call the resulting expected waiting cost T .
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For the RI customers, because wait time is dependent on priority, and 1 is the
highest priority, the resulting W (RI, p̂) is a non-increasing function with respect to
p̂. Thus, W (RI, p̂) +C is also a non-increasing function as C is constant. Therefore,
W (RI, p̂) + C and T intersect at most once.
If W (RI, p̂) + C < T for all p̂, all customers choose RI. Therefore, such a situa-
tion results is a threshold strategy with threshold equal to priority 0. Conversely, if
W (RI, p̂) + C > T for all p̂, all customers choose NRI and thus follow a threshold
strategy with threshold equal to priority 1.
Otherwise, the two costs intersect. They either intersect at a single point φ, or
they intersect along an interval p̂ ∈ [φ1, φ2]. In the former case, W (RI, p̂) + C < T
for p̂ > φ, and W (RI, p̂) + C > T for p̂ < φ, and thus φ is the threshold. In the
later, for p̂ ∈ [φ1, φ2], W (RI, p̂) + C = T and thus no customer has incentive to
choose RI over NRI and therefore no customer does so. Combined with the fact that
W (RI, p̂) + C < T for p̂ > φ2, and W (RI, p̂) + C > T for p̂ < φ1, the result is a
threshold of φ2.
Applying this result, we define φ to be the threshold priority value. Given a
desired threshold φ, we wish to derive the corresponding RI cost from (3.1). We note
that in choosing NRI, a customer is automatically assigned priority 0. Therefore we
have W (NRI, φ) = W (NRI, 0). The resulting cost function is then given by:
C(φ) , W (NRI, 0)−W (RI, φ). (3.2)
C(φ) is a continuous function, as W (NRI, 0) is a constant, and W (RI, φ) is contin-
uous over φ ∈ [0, 1]. This assertion comes from the fact that the wait time functions
are derived from well defined formulas for wait time in an M |G|1 queue with priority
(Conway et al., 1967, pp164-175). We show this explicitly in sections 3.2, 3.3, and
3.4.
34
Definition 2. The following special quantities of C(φ) are used as short hand to









From the quantities in Definition 2, we define the conditions under which each of
the equilibrium types are possible in the following theorems.
Theorem 1. If C is such that C < C < C, then at least one some − reserve
equilibrium is possible.
Proof. As C < C < C, and C(φ) continuous, it follows that there is at least one
solution to C(φ) = C for φ ∈ [0, 1] by the definitions of C and C. Therefore, at least
one some− reserve equilibrium exists.
Theorem 2. If C is such that C < C0, then an all− reserve equilibrium is possible
Proof. As 0 is the lowest possible priority, and priorities are assigned based on arrival
during the reservation period, then φ = 0 corresponds to a situation where all cus-
tomers have arrived. Because C < C0, the cost to choose RI is less than the difference
in waiting times for the priority 0 customer. As a result, all customers have incentive
to choose RI, and this situation corresponds to the all − reserve equilibrium.
Theorem 3. If C is such that C < C, then an all − reserve is the only equilibrium
possible.
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Proof. C < C implies C < C(0) and thus an all − reserve equilibrium exists. How-
ever, C < C and C(φ) continuous implies that C(φ) = C has no solutions in [0, 1]
and thus no other equilibrium types are possible.
Theorem 4. If C is such that C > C1, then a none− reserve equilibrium is possible
Proof. 1 is the highest priority, and so φ = 1 corresponds to a situation where no
customers have arrived. Because C > C1, the cost to choose RI for the first customer
to arrive is greater than the difference in waiting times for that customer. As a
result, no customers have incentive to choose RI, corresponding to a none− reserve
equilibrium.
Theorem 5. If C is such that C > C, then the none − reserve equilibrium is the
only possible equilibrium
Proof. C > C implies that C > C(1), therefore a none − reserve equilibrium is
possible. As C > C and C(φ) continuous, then no solution to C(φ) = C exists in
(0, 1). Thus, no other equilibrium types are possible.
Having established that the Nash equilibrium must correspond to a threshold
equilibrium, as well as the conditions under which the all− reserve, none− reserve,
and some− reserve equilibrium types are possible, we now begin our analysis of the
impacts the specific preemption policies have on the equilibrium possibilities.
3.2 Non Preemptive Policy
The first preemption policy we will consider is a basic M |G|1 non preemptive queue.
No customer is preempted once in service, regardless of priority. We find that the
behavior of the cost curve, and therefore the possible equilibria regions, does not
depend on the second moment of service. Instead, the only factor which will impact
36
which equilibrium possibilities can occur is the value of the service load ρ. In addition,
we find that an all − reserve equilibrium is not possible under this policy.
We begin by deriving and analyzing an explicit expression for C(φ). We note that
an explicit formula for the wait time of a class p customer in an M |G|1 queue with
priorities and no preemption is well defined, as stated in (Conway et al., 1967, p.164):
Wp =
λE[X2]
2(1− ρa − ρp)(1− ρa)
.
As all customers are statistically identical under our model, E[X2] = K
µ2
does
not depend on the class of customer. Therefore, the quantities which depend on the






. Consider a RI customer. Their priority is
some p > 0. From the perspective of a customer in this priority class, there are three
relative classes of customer based upon the priorities of the customers:
1. The class of all customers with higher priority than this customer, arriving at
rate λa = λ(1− p).
2. The class of the current customer, arriving at rate λp = 0, as there can only be
one customer in this class.
3. The class of all customers with lower priority than this customer, arriving at
rate λb = λp.




Meanwhile, NRI customers are assigned a priority of zero automatically, therefore
the two classes of customers from the perspective of such a customer are:
1. The class of customers choosing RI, arriving at rate λa = λ(1− φ).
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2. The class of customers choosing NRI, arriving at rate λp = λφ.
Thus, the expected wait time for an NRI customer W (NRI, 0) is given by:
ρK
2µ(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))
. (3.4)




2µ(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))2
. (3.5)
By inspection, we see that the numerator and denominator of CNP (φ) are both
continuous functions, and the denominator will not equal zero for any φ ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, this function is continuous as asserted in section 3.1, and from Theorems
1-5, we will be able to define the regions where the equilibrium types are possible.
In order to apply Definition 2 to the NP case, we first determine the behavior of the
cost function.
Lemma 2. CNP (φ) is monotonically increasing for ρ ≤ 12 , and unimodal with a global
maximum otherwise.
Proof. Our assertion relates to the increasing and decreasing behavior of CNP (φ). To
determine this, we calculate the intervals for which the sign of the first derivative
of CNP (φ) are positive or negative for φ ∈ (0, 1). Computing dCNPdφ results in the
following:
ρ2K(1− ρ(1 + φ))
2µ(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))3
. (3.6)
By assumption, our system is stable so ρ < 1, therefore 1 − ρ > 0. Further, K ≥ 1
and µ > 0 by the definitions of the parameters. As a result, we can factor out these
positive terms, and solve for where the remaining terms are positive or negative,
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which will determine the sign of the derivative as a whole:
1− ρ(1 + φ)
(1− ρ(1− φ))3
Examining the denominator, we note that φ ∈ (0, 1) results in 1− φ ∈ (0, 1). As
the system is stable, ρ(1 − φ) ∈ (0, 1) follows. Therefore, 1 − ρ(1 − φ) > 0, and the
denominator is always positive. Combined with the results in the previous paragraph,
the sign of the derivative will be determined by the sign of 1− ρ(1 + φ). If this term
is positive, the derivative is positive; if the term is negative, the derivative is as well.
As φ ∈ (0, 1) implies 1 + φ ∈ (1, 2) and ρ ∈ (0, 1), if ρ ≤ 1
2
, then 1− ρ(1 + φ) > 0
for all φ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, if ρ ≤ 1
2
the derivative will be positive and thus the
function will be monotonically increasing for all φ ∈ [0, 1]
Otherwise, if ρ ∈ (1
2
, 1), then when φ = 0, ρ(1+φ) = ρ < 1 and so 1−ρ(1+φ) > 0
follows. When φ = 1, ρ(1+φ) = 2ρ > 1 and 1−ρ(1+φ) < 0 results. As the expression
is linear in φ, this implies the sign changes exactly once in the interval φ ∈ (0, 1).
Solving where the expression equals zero, we find this occurs when φ = 1−ρ
ρ
.
Therefore, for φ < 1−ρ
ρ
the sign of the derivative is positive and CNP (φ) is in-
creasing; for φ > 1−ρ
ρ
the sign of the derivative is negative and CNP (φ) is decreas-
ing. Therefore, CNP (φ) is unimodal for
1
2




From the result of Lemma 2, we have the following definition:
Definition 3. The values from Definition 2 are applied to the NP queue as follows:








C1 NP for ρ ≤ 12
ρK




As C0 NP is equal to 0 for all values of ρ,K, we immediately conclude that an
all − reserve equilibrium is not possible. We also observe that the minimum and
maximum values do not depend on the value of K, and thus ρ is the only parameter
of interest. Therefore, by consequence of the above definitions and the results of
Theorems 1-5, the following holds:
Theorem 6. The M |G|1 queue with reservations and a NP policy in effect has the
following structure for the cost to purchase RI
Case I; ρ ≤ 1
2
:
• If C < CNP , there is a unique some− reserve equilibrium.
• If C > CNP , there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.
Case II; 1
2
< ρ < 1:
• If C < C1 NP , there is a unique some− reserve equilibrium.
• If C1 NP < C < CNP , there are two some− reserve equilibria and one none−
reserve equilibrium.
• If C > CNP , there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.
Examples of how the value of ρ impacts the behavior of CNP (φ) and thus the
impact on equilibrium type possibilities are found in Figures 3·2 and 3·3.
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Figure 3·2: Example of the cost function in an NP queue with K = 2,
µ = 1 and ρ = 1
4
. The function is monotone increasing, so for any cost
C below CNP , there is a unique some− reserve equilibrium.
3.3 Preemptive Resume Policy
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the PR policy on the cost to purchase a
reservation. We note that this policy was previously studied in (Simhon and Starobin-
ski, 2018), however the scope of that work was limited to considering an M |D|1 queue.
Here, we will show results under the policy for a general service distribution. In par-
ticular, we find that in the PR policy the equilibrium possibilities are determined by
the value of ρ, and the possible equilibrium types for a given value of ρ are the same
as those in the NP policy for that value of ρ.
In addition, because all customers are subject to preemption, we find that cus-
tomers are willing to pay a greater cost compared to a system where the NP policy
is in effect. In fact, we find that the cost corresponding to a threshold φ is exactly a
factor of ρ greater in a system with all customers subject to preemption compared to
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Figure 3·3: Example of the cost function in an NP queue with K = 2,
µ = 1 and ρ = 3
4
. In contrast to Figure 3·2 we see the cost function
is unimodal, and in the region between C1 NP and CNP there are two
some− reserve equilibria, and one none− reserve.
a system where no customers can be preempted.
As before the first step is to derive the cost function C(φ) for this policy, as
determined by the expected wait time at the threshold. As all customers are subject
to preemption, their expected wait time is derived from the formula the system flow
time for a class p customer in a preemptive resume queue, as stated in (Conway et al.,
1967, p.175). In the below formula, i is a variable corresponding to classes drawn from





















We note that the originally cited formula assumed a discrete number of customer
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classes, however as noted in the previous chapter, (Master et al., 2017) shows that
the result also holds in a case where priorities are assigned via continuum, and thus
the use of integration in conjunction with priorities assigned from U [0, 1] is valid.
We note that the discrete version of the formula (Conway et al., 1967, p.175)
is defined in terms of the current customer’s class p and the higher priority classes.
The integrals with a lower limit of i > p denote the integrals which involve only
higher priority classes. The integrals with a lower limit of i = p denote the integrals
which include the customer’s current class as well. The distinction between these is
most important when considering NRI customers, whose class is p = 0 by definition.
The next highest class is the threshold φ. Because of the resulting discontinuity it
is necessary to distinguish between the integrals where the lower limit is φ, and the
integrals where the lower limit is 0.
E[Xgp] is the expected gross service time for a class p customer. However, we
note that as all customers in a preemptive resume queue restart service from the
point of interruption, there is no time wasted by preemption, and so the expected
gross service time will be identical to the expected service time. As customers are
statistically identical, E[Xgp] =
1
µ





























Because the PR policy is in effect, any customer will preempt a customer of a class
lower than it, and be preempted by a member of a class higher than it. Therefore,
the classes from the perspective of a RI or NRI customer are the same as in section
3.2. Given this, the wait time formulas WRI(φ) and WNRI(φ) are:
WRI(φ) ,




















2µ(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))2
. (3.9)
In determining where different equilibrium possibilities exist, we observe that
CNP (φ) = ρCPR(φ). As ρ is a constant parameter, CPR(φ) has the same increas-
ing/decreasing behavior as CNP (φ):
Lemma 3. CPR(φ) is monotonically increasing for ρ ≤ 12 , and unimodal with a global
maximum otherwise.
Proof. Because we are making an assertion on the increasing and decreasing behavior




ρK(1− ρ(1 + φ))
2µ(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))3
. (3.10)
As before, we note that µ > 0, K ≥ 1, and ρ < 1 → 1− ρ > 0, therefore the sign of
the derivative depends only on the sign of the expression 1−ρ(1+φ)
(1−ρ(1−φ))3 . The remainder
of the proof follows from the proof of Lemma 3.
Definition 4. The values from Definition 2 are applied to the PR case as follows:







C1 PR for ρ ≤ 12
K





Theorem 7. The M |G|1 queue with reservations and a PR policy in effect has the
following structure for the cost to purchase RI
Case I; ρ ≤ 1
2
:
• If C < CPR, there is a unique some− reserve equilibrium.
• If C > CPR, there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.
Case II; 1
2
< ρ < 1:
• If C < C1 PR, there is a unique some− reserve equilibrium.
• If C1 PR < C < CPR, there are two some− reserve equilibria and one none−
reserve equilibrium.
• If C > CPR, there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.
The proof follows by applying the results of Theorems 1-5 to Definition 4.
Thus, while the values of C1, C will differ, the PR and NP policies have the same
behavior for the cost function as demonstrated in Figures 3·4 and 3·5. However, in
both cases we find that an all − reserve equilibrium cannot occur, and the possible
equilibrium types depend only on ρ. As will be seen in the next section, this stands
in stark contrast to the HPR policy, where the value of K also has an effect on the
equilibrium type possibilities, and an all − reserve equilibrium can occur.
3.4 Hybrid Preemptive/Non Preemptive Policy
In this section we consider a situation where the HPR policy as defined in section
3.1 is in effect. We define the cost function and find that the second moment of
service has a significant impact on the possible equilibrium regions. In particular,
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Figure 3·4: Example of the cost function in an PR queue with K = 2,
µ = 1 and ρ = 1
4
. In comparison to the equivalent NP case in 3·2, the
function behavior is the same but the cost ranges over a larger set of
values in the PR case.
depending on the level of variance in service times, the behavior of the cost curve
varies significantly and results in some situations where C0 > C1, and others where
the reverse is the case. This in turn impacts the ranges where all− reserve equilibria
are possible, and whether it is possible to have a situation where an all − reserve
equilibrium exists but is not unique.
In deriving the formula for C(φ) in this policy, we note from the definition while
RI customers preempt an NRI customer which is in service, they cannot preempt any
RI customers being served. Thus, RI customers behave as if NP behavior applies,
and NRI customers behave as if PR behavior applies.
For a customer choosing RI, the expected wait time is derived from the wait
time formula for NP queues from (Conway et al., 1967, p.164). However, unlike the
situation in Section 3.2, NRI customers are preempted, and no impact on RI customer
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Figure 3·5: Example of the cost function in an PR queue with K = 2,
µ = 1 and ρ = 3
4
. Like with ρ = 1
4
, in comparison to the equivalent NP
case in 3·3 the function behavior is the same but the cost ranges over
a larger set of values in the PR case.
wait times. Therefore, RI customers are only impacted by other RI customers. From
the perspective of a class p > φ customer, the three classes of customers present are:
1. The class of customers choosing RI prior to this customer, arriving at rate
λa = λ(1− p).
2. The class of the current customer, arriving at rate λp = 0, as there can only be
one customer in this class.
3. The class of customers choosing RI after this customer, arriving at rate λb =
λ(p− φ).






For NRI customers, the expected wait time is derived from the definition of the
system flow time for a class p customer in a PR queue from (Conway et al., 1967,
p.175). Customers choosing NRI are all priority 0 customers by definition, and further
these customers get preempted by any RI customer. Therefore from the perspective
of the NRI customer the classes of customers are the same as in the NP and PR














2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ)) +Kρφ




As before, we now consider the possible equilibria regions that exist for this pre-
emption policy. As the below lemma asserts, unlike previous cases we find that the
level of variance present in the service distribution impacts the behavior of the cost
function:











, and is unimodal with a unique
maximum otherwise.
Proof. Our assertion is related to the increasing and decreasing behavior of the func-
tion CHPR(φ). As a result, we begin by taking the derivative of CHPR, and determine







Kρ(1− ρ(1 + φ))− 2ρ(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))




As µ > 0, we immediately conclude that the sign of the derivative depends entirely
on the sign of the term inside the parentheses. As 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, we find
that 1− ρ and (1− ρ(1−φ))3 are always positive. This results in the denominator of
(3.13) always being positive. Therefore, the sign of the derivative depends solely on
the sign of the numerator of the parenthetical term.
As 1 − ρ and 1 − ρ(1 − φ) are always positive for the ρ, φ under consideration,
−2ρ(ρ−1)(1−ρ(1−φ)) will always be negative. However the sign of 1−ρ(1+φ), and
thus the sign of Kρ(1−ρ(1+φ)), depends on the specific values of ρ, φ. Consequently,
whether the numerator, and therefore the entire derivative, is positive depends on the
values of K, ρ, and φ. Solving for the condition on φ where the numerator is positive
yields the following:
φ <
2ρ2 + (K − 4)ρ+ (2−K)
2ρ2 − (K + 2)ρ
. (3.14)
Any transition between the sign of the derivative being positive and negative must
occur when the numerator is equal to zero. As (3.14) is defined in terms of the
numerator being greater than zero, this transition occurs when φ is equal to the RHS
of the inequality. We therefore denote the quantity on the RHS of (3.14) as φopt. As
φ ∈ [0, 1], and the inequality is linear in φ, we have three possibilities on φopt:
1. φopt < 0, in which case no values of φ result in the derivative being positive and
thus CHPR is monotonically decreasing.
2. 0 < φopt < 1, in which case CHPR transitions from increasing to decreasing at
φopt and therefore is unimodal.
3. φopt > 1, in which case all values of φ result in the derivative being positive and
thus CHPR is monotonically increasing.






. Thus, for such K and ρ no values of φ ∈ [0, 1] result in the derivative
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being positive; therefore the function CHPR is monotonically decreasing. Similarly,






satisfying the conditions, all values of φ ∈ [0, 1] result in the derivative being positive,
thus CHPR is monotonically increasing.
Otherwise, φopt will be in the interval [0, 1], and thus the derivative will transition
from being positive to negative at φopt. Thus, CHPR is unimodal with the maximum
occurring at CHPR(φ
opt)
As K is the parameter corresponding to the second moment of service, we conclude
that the variance in service times impacts the possible equilibrium types. This in turn
will impact the maximum possible revenue a provider can obtain, as discussed in the
revenue analysis.












C1 HPR for K ∈ [1, 2]
C0 HPR for K ≥ 2,
CHPR =













C0 HPR is a constant, and will be greater than 0 for all ρ ∈ (0, 1). Thus no matter
what service distribution applies, there is always a range of costs where all−make−
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AR is possible. However, the values of C1 HPR and CHPR depend on K, and CHPR
depends on K and ρ. As a result, there are three cases to consider when evaluating
the regions where the equilibria types exist: K < 2, K > 2, and K = 2. In the
following subsections, we present an explicit outline of each case individually.
3.4.1 Equilibria in Systems with Low Variance of Service
Here, we consider the system where K < 2, and thus there is low variance in the
service time of customers. The relevant maximum and minimum values of CHPR(φ)
are:













If ρ < 2−K
2
, the function is monotone decreasing. Otherwise, it is unimodal. In
addition, K < 2 implies that C1 HPR < C0 HPR for all ρ. Based on this behavior, we
apply the results of Theorems 1-5 to assert the following:
Theorem 8. The M |G|1 queue with reservations, a HPR policy in place, and K < 2
has the following structure for the cost to purchase RI.
Case I; ρ < 2−K
2
:
• If C < CHPR, there is a unique all − reserve equilibrium.
• if CHPR < C < CHPR, there are multiple equilibria: one each of all − reserve,
some− reserve, and none− reserve.
• if C > CHPR, there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.




Figure 3·6: Example of the cost function in a system using the HPR
policy with K = 1, µ = 1 and ρ = 1
4
. Note in comparison to the func-
tions from the equivalent NP and PR cases, the function is monotone
decreasing, thus all − reserve equilibria will exist.
• If C < CHPR, there is a unique all − reserve equilibrium.
• if CHPR < C < C0 HPR, there are multiple equilibria: one each of all−reserve,
some− reserve, and none− reserve.
• if C0 HPR < C < CHPR, there are multiple equilibria: two some− reserve and
one none− reserve
• if C > CHPR, there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.
Figures 3·6 and 3·7 contains a visual example of these two possibilities. In partic-
ular, we note that all values of CHPR(φ) are greater than 0, thus there exists a region
of costs where a unique all − reserve equilibrium occurs, unlike before.
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Figure 3·7: Example of the cost function in a system using the HPR
policy with K = 1, µ = 1 and ρ = 3
4
. Similarly to the equivalent
NP and PR cases, the function is unimodal. However, here there are
regions where an all − reserve equilibrium type exists.
3.4.2 Equilibria in a System with Exponential Service Distribution
A system with exponential service, that is an M |M |1 queue, represents a special
case of the behavior of CHPR(φ). To see why, we note the maximum, minimum, and















C0 HPR and C1 HPR are equal to each other and are the minimum value of the cost
function. As a result, the cost function for the M |M |1 version of the HPR policy
is always unimodal, regardless of the value of ρ. As a result, there is only one case
to consider when defining the regions where equilibria exist. The following holds by
consequence of Theorems 1-5:
Theorem 9. The M |M |1 queue with reservations and a HPR policy in place has the
following structure for the cost to purchase RI.
• If C < CHPR, there is a unique all − reserve equilibrium.
• If CHPR < C < CHPR, there are multiple equilibria: two some − reserve and
one none− reserve.
• If C > CHPR, there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.
Figure 3·8 illustrates this behavior. No region with a unique some − reserve
equilibrium can exist, however a unique all− reserve equilibrium is possible, because
the minimum value of CHPR(φ) for K = 2, µ = 1, ρ = 0.5 is 1.
3.4.3 Equilibria in Systems with High Variance of Service
Here, we consider the system when K > 2, and there is a high variance in the
service times. The relevant maximum and minimum values of CHPR are given by the
following:
CHPR = C0 HPR,
CHPR =








Thus, the function is monotone increasing for ρ < K−2
2K−2 , and unimodal otherwise.
As K > 2, C1 HPR > C0 HPR for all ρ follows. As a result, we have the following
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Figure 3·8: Example of cost behavior in an HPR policy where K = 2,
ρ = 0.5, µ = 1. Note how there does not exist a region where only one
some− reserve equilibrium exists.
theorem for the equilibrium region definitions. Again, this follows as a consequence
of the results from Theorems 1-5:
Theorem 10. The M |G|1 queue with reservations, a HPR policy in place, and K > 2
has the following structure for the cost to purchase RI.
Case I; ρ < K−2
2K−2 :
• If If C < CHPR, there is a unique all − reserve equilibrium.
• If CHPR < C < CHPR, there is a unique some− reserve equilibrium.
• If C > CHPR, there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.
Case II; ρ > K−2
2K−2 :
• If If C < CHPR, there is a unique all − reserve equilibrium.
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Figure 3·9: Example of Equilibrium region possibilities in a system
using the HPR policy with K = 3, µ = 1, and ρ = 1
5
. The behavior of
the cost function is similar to the equivalent NP or PR cases, except
that CHPR(0) 6= 0. An all− reserve equilibrium region is possible here
as a result.
• If CHPR < C < C1 HPR, there is a unique some− reserve equilibrium.
• if C1 HPR < C < CHPR, there are multiple equilibria: two some− reserve and
one none− reserve.
• If C > CHPR, there is a unique none− reserve equilibrium.
In Figures 3·9 and 3·10 we see examples of the behavior, and the figures for ρ = 1
5
and ρ = 4
5
behave similarly to the ρ = 1
4
and ρ = 3
4
plots respectively from Figures 3·2,
3·3, 3·4, and 3·5. However, in addition to regions with one some−reserve equilibrium
or two some − reserve and one none − reserve equilibria being possible, there also
exists a region where a unique all− reserve equilibrium is possible, as an inspection
of the C axis shows that the minimum value of CHPR(φ) is not 0.
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Figure 3·10: Example of Equilibrium region possibilities in a system
using the HPR policy with K = 3, µ = 1, and ρ = 4
5
. Again we see that
the behavior of the cost function for the equivalent NP and PR cases,
but as CHPR(0) 6= 0 an all − reserve equilibrium region is possible in
this case.
We see as a consequence of Theorems 8, 9, and 10 that the service distribution has
a large impact on the equilibria regions that can occur. While the main consequence
of this behavior is apparent when analyzing the provider revenues as will be examined
in Chapter 4, one of the key insights of this result is the fact that this behavior is not
observed in the NP or PR policies.
The differences in behavior are the result of the advantages of making a reservation
in each of the three policies. If PR or NP are in effect, either any customer is eligible
to be preempted, or no customer is. As a result, the advantage of making a reservation
is limited to purchasing priority. In contrast, in the HPR policy customers making
reservations may not be preempted, while customers who forgo reservation are eligible
to be preempted.
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This in turn explains why an all−reserve equilibrium is possible in the HPR case
and not for NP or PR. Consider a situation with a customer of potential priority 0.
This is the lowest possible priority, and represents a customer who is the last to make
the reservation decision before service begins. If NP or PR is in effect, the reservation
decision does not affect eligibility for preemption. And since this is the last customer,
purchasing priority does not yield an advantage of gaining priority over anyone else.
Therefore, there is never incentive to spend C as it cannot impact what happens once
the customer attempts to secure service. If the HPR policy is in effect, purchasing
becomes the difference between being preempted or not being preempted. Thus, even
though this customer has priority 0, incentive to purchase a reservation may exist to
prevent preemption by other customers in order to complete service more quickly.
In general, comparing CHPR(φ) and CPR(φ) shows that for all ρ, K, and φ,
CHPR(φ) is the larger quantity. This holds as solving whether CHPR(φ) > CPR(φ)
holds reduces to determining whether the following holds:
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ)) (1− (1− ρ(1− φ))) > 0.
From the definitions of the parameters, ρ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, 1 − ρ will
be a positive quantity. Further, 1 − φ will be some value between 0 and 1, thus
ρ(1− φ) ∈ (0, 1) follows. Therefore, 1− ρ(1− φ) will also be a value between 0 and
1, and from there it is clear that all of the factors on the left hand side are positive,
therefore the inequality holds. This result implies that customers in general have
greater incentive to purchase a reserved instance in the HPR policy, and the cost
leading to a threshold φ will be greater than under the PR policy, and by extension
the NP policy as it was previously shown that CPR(φ) > CNP .
Moreover, the HPR policy resulting in service distribution having an impact on
equilibria possibilities is also related to the difference in preemption behavior. Be-
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cause a customer with a reservation cannot be preempted, they save 1
µ
of waiting
time in the queue from the arrival of a customer with a higher priority reservation.
Conversely, the higher priority customer is imposed with an expected waiting time
equal to the residual time when encountering a non-preemptible customer. The resid-
ual time quantity is equal to K
2µ
. Because a customer can pay to avoid preemption,
this difference in wait times become part of the cost calculation. And for particularly
large K, the average time in service of a preempting customer is much less than the
expected residual time of the preempted customer. As a consequence, the relative
price low priority customers are willing to pay to make a reservation decreases as K
increases, since the additional wait time is expected to be small in relation to the
time remaining in service.
3.5 Simulations of Single Server Queues
With the cost functions defined for each preemption policy, in this section we present
simulations developed using Python to validate the results. These simulations com-
pare the difference in waiting time near a specified threshold for customers making
reservations and customers who do not. As the cost is defined in terms of the wait
time in the queue, the intent of the simulations is to validate the correctness of the
expected wait time expressions, and thus the resulting cost formula.
The simulators are developed in Python using SimPy version 3. A detailed ex-
planation of the simulation algorithms follows in Appendix A. At a high level, the
simulation consists of creating two streams of customers, and then placing them into
a priority queue that the server draws from.
The first stream of customers created is a stream of regular customers. They
arrive at a rate λ and are randomly assigned a priority between 0 and 1 to simulate
the reservation decision. The priority is checked against the threshold. If the assigned
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priority results in the customer deciding against reserving, the priority is updated to
be 0, otherwise the customer keeps the originally assigned priority. The customer
then enters the queue sorted by priority and entry time. If the newly added customer
would preempt the one in service, a signal is sent to the server to interrupt the current
process.
The other stream of customers created is a stream of ghost customers. The purpose
of the ghosts is to create customers with consistent priorities that have a wait time but
not a service time, thus allowing for measurement of wait time in the queue. Ghosts
arrive at a fraction of the rate λ and are assigned priority φ + ε or 0 with equal
probability, for some small ε. If the ghost would preempt the customer in service, the
appropriate signal is triggered to process the event even though technically the ghost
is not served as noted below.
Both streams of customers are added to the same priority queue. The server will
grab the customer with the highest priority currently in the queue, and process it for
service. If this customer is flagged as a ghost, the server records the wait time and




The simulations are repeated for 30 iterations for the values of K,λ, µ specified
by the user. Each iteration runs for 5∗10
6
λ
time units. Because λ is the average arrival
rate, the sliding scale of time units to run the simulation over results in approximately
five million customers being created during each simulation run. At each iteration,
the reservation cost is stored as the difference between the mean wait times of ghost
customers who do not make a reservation, and the mean wait times of ghost customers
who do.
At the conclusion of the iterations, the mean of the reservation costs are computed,
as well as the delta of the confidence interval. The interval is defined such that the
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true mean lies in the interval for a specified confidence level. Given the Cumulative
Distribution Function of the standard normal distribution Φ, the number of iterations
n, the confidence level α, and the standard deviation of the samples σ, the delta of















= 1.96. As n = 30, the confidence interval δ is equal to approximately
0.3578σ.
In the following subsections, we present sample results for our simulations for
each preemption policy. In all the simulations, µ = 1, thus the resulting cost can
be considered to be the normalized cost with respect to the first moment of service
parameter1.
3.5.1 Simulation of NP Queue
We begin by presenting simulation results with an NP queue in effect. We will use the
simulation of the M |M |1 (i.e., K = 2) queue for our examples. To demonstrate the
impact of the ρ parameter on the results, we run simulations for ρ ∈ {0.5, 0.9}, and
compare the results of the simulations to those expected from the formula CNP (φ).
Figures 3·11 and 3·12 show the comparison between the simulated and analytical
costs for the threshold values we simulate over. These are reinforced by the numerical
results in Table 3.2. In the tables, Csim is the mean of the simulated costs, and δerr
is the delta of the 95% confidence interval. All values are rounded to four decimal
places.
In examining the results, we find that the difference between the value of CNP (φ)
1As for why the cost formulas are not normalized with respect to µ by default like they were with
respect to α, this will become apparent when the function for revenue from reservations is defined
in equation (4.1)
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and the value of Csim is less than the δ of the confidence interval in almost all cases,
thus we can assert with a high degree of confidence that the simulations validate our
analytical results from section 3.2. For the value of φ where the confidence interval
does not contain the expected value of CNP , that is {ρ = 0.9, φ = 0.5}, the difference
in the simulated and true values is approximately 0.5 percent of the true value.
Thus, the discrepancy most likely arises from the fact that by definition the true
mean will be outside the confidence interval five percent of the time when using a
95% confidence interval. Given that the difference in the true and simulated values
is small relative to the true value of CNP (φ), the error is unlikely to be significant.
As a result, we are confident that the simulations validate our results.
Figure 3·11: Plot of a M |M |1 simulation with NP, ρ = 0.5, as com-
pared to the values obtained from the equation CNP (φ)
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Figure 3·12: Plot of a M |M |1 simulation with NP, ρ = 0.9, as com-
pared to the values obtained from the equation CNP (φ)
Table 3.2: Numerical results of the M |M |1-NP simulation, for ρ = 0.5
and ρ = 0.9.
φ CNP (φ) Csim δerr
0.1 0.1653 0.1665 0.0037
0.2 0.2778 0.2754 0.0034
0.3 0.3550 0.3538 0.0028
0.4 0.4082 0.4062 0.0021
0.5 0.4444 0.4440 0.0021
0.6 0.4687 0.4686 0.0027
0.7 0.4844 0.4822 0.0022
0.8 0.4938 0.4954 0.0016
0.9 0.4986 0.4978 0.0017
ρ = 0.5
φ CNP (φ) Csim δerr
0.1 22.4377 22.5646 0.1993
0.2 20.6633 20.7424 0.0900
0.3 17.7502 17.7272 0.0849
0.4 15.3119 15.3472 0.0560
0.5 13.3884 13.4486 0.0515
0.6 11.8652 11.8451 0.0488
0.7 10.6399 10.6584 0.0425
0.8 9.6371 9.6667 0.0377
0.9 8.8033 8.8049 0.0321
ρ = 0.9
3.5.2 Simulation of PR Queue
In this section, we present the results of a simulator where the PR policy is in effect.
As in the previous section, we will use the simulation of the M |M |1 (K = 2) queue
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for our examples. Figures 3·13, and 3·14 and Table 3.3 contain the simulation results
for ρ ∈ {0.5, 0.9}. As before, values are rounded to four decimal places.
We again find that the difference between the true value of CPR(φ) and Csim falls
either within δerr or just outside of it. And the cases where the difference falls just
beyond δerr, ρ = 0.5 and φ = 0.3, 0.8, not only is the margin exceeded by a small
amount relative to the cost values, rounding error may also play a part. Especially in
the case of φ = 0.8, where the difference between the analytical and simulated values
is 0.0020, but the δerr is equal to 0.0019.
As a result, like with the NP case, we can conclude that the simulations validate
our results with a high degree of certainty.
Figure 3·13: Plot of a M |M |1 simulation with PR, ρ = 0.5, as com-
pared to the values obtained from the equation CPR(φ)
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Figure 3·14: Plot of a M |M |1 simulation with PR, ρ = 0.9, as com-
pared to the values obtained from the equation CPR(φ)
Table 3.3: Numerical results of the M |M |1-PR simulation, for ρ = 0.5
and ρ = 0.9.
φ CPR(φ) Csim δerr
0.1 0.3306 0.3290 0.0043
0.2 0.5556 0.5556 0.0042
0.3 0.7101 0.7135 0.0029
0.4 0.8163 0.8179 0.0029
0.5 0.8889 0.8888 0.0030
0.6 0.9375 0.9371 0.0016
0.7 0.9689 0.9680 0.0012
0.8 0.9877 0.9897 0.0019
0.9 0.9972 0.9975 0.0014
ρ = 0.5
φ CNP (φ) Csim δerr
0.1 24.9307 24.8155 0.1864
0.2 22.9592 22.9659 0.0941
0.3 19.7224 19.6996 0.1033
0.4 17.0132 16.9619 0.0517
0.5 14.8760 14.9061 0.0557
0.6 13.1836 13.1598 0.0528
0.7 11.8221 11.8273 0.0356
0.8 10.7079 10.6974 0.0370
0.9 9.7814 9.7948 0.0327
ρ = 0.9
3.5.3 Simulations of HPR Queues
Here we consider simulations under the HPR preemption policy. As in the previous
subsections we present examples featuring an M |M |1 queue, and ρ ∈ {0.5, 0.9}.
65
Figures 3·15 and 3·16 and Table 3.4 show the comparisons between the values of
CHPR(φ) and the simulated cost values Csim and the delta of the 95% confidence
interval δerr. All values are again rounded to four decimal places.
Figure 3·15: Plot and corresponding table of numerical results of
a M |M |1 simulation with HPR, ρ = 0.5, as compared to the values
obtained from the equation CHPR(φ)
We find that the simulated costs in these examples lie within δerr of the true mean,
thus we have confidence that our simulator results are valid for the HPR policy as
well.
As a result, we conclude from the simulation results that our analytical results
from this chapter are valid. Further, we have a simulator which we can use in future
work as the basis for considering multiple server cases.
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Figure 3·16: Plot of a M |M |1 simulation with HPR, ρ = 0.9, as
compared to the values obtained from the equation CHPR(φ)
Table 3.4: Numerical results of the M |M |1-HPR simulation, for ρ =
0.5, 0.5.
φ CHPR(φ) Csim δerr
0.1 1.1488 1.1523 0.0051
0.2 1.2222 1.2248 0.0048
0.3 1.2485 1.2491 0.0038
0.4 1.2449 1.2434 0.0027
0.5 1.2222 1.2208 0.0031
0.6 1.1875 1.1895 0.0023
0.7 1.1456 1.1456 0.0020
0.8 1.0988 1.0978 0.0015
0.9 1.0499 1.0501 0.0016
ρ = 0.5
φ CHPR(φ) Csim δerr
0.1 29.1939 29.0940 0.1556
0.2 25.5306 25.3936 0.1450
0.3 21.4251 21.4658 0.0918
0.4 18.1871 18.1497 0.0914
0.5 15.6942 15.6661 0.0650
0.6 13.7461 13.7613 0.0568
0.7 12.1920 12.2284 0.0465
0.8 10.9274 10.9060 0.0377
0.9 9.8803 9.9060 0.0351
ρ = 0.9
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we defined a model based upon an Advance Reservation model to
describe a game between some stochastic number of customers, and a single server
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provider. Customers determine that they require service at some future time and
receive a potential priority from the provider as well as the corresponding fee to pur-
chase a reservation at that priority. Based on this and known statistical information
about the arrival rate, service rate, and variance in service times, customers decided
whether to purchase a reserved instance or enter the service queue to obtain a non
reserved instance. Providers have the decision to set the reservation fee as well as
determine whether customers shall be preempted by higher priority customers or not.
Providers can choose to preempt no one, preempt all customers, or only preempt
customers without a reservation.
Based on this model, we determined that the only possible equilibrium states
that can occur in this game are of a threshold equilibrium type, where the threshold
corresponds to a priority where the expected cost of waiting with a reservation is
equal to the expected cost of waiting with no reservation. From this, we define the
conditions under which equilibria where all customers choose to reserve, no customers
choose to reserve, or only some of the customers choose to reserve occur.
We then derive expressions for the cost function under each of the preemption
policies. We find that the possible equilibria states in the NP or PR policies are
determined solely by the value of the system load. We also find that the cost leading
to a threshold φ in the PR policy is greater than the cost leading to that same
threshold in the equivalent NP case. In contrast, in the HPR policy the parameter
K corresponding to the service variance impacts the possible equilibrium states. In
addition, in the HPR policy states where all customers reserve can occur, something
which is impossible in the NP or PR policies. Finally, we show that the cost leading
to a threshold of φ in the HPR case is greater than the cost in the equivalent NP
or PR case, demonstrating that in general, customers have the greatest incentive to
purchase a reserved instance if the HPR policy is in effect as the purchasing decision
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concerns the ability to protect against preemption.
Finally, we describe a simulator built using Python’s SimPy routine to validate our
results, and we find that for all three policies, the predicted cost to make a reservation
with threshold φ based on the previously derived expressions falls within the bounds
of the 95% confidence interval of our simulated costs. Ergo, the simulator validates
the results from our single server model, and can be leveraged to simulate situations
with multiple servers.
In the next chapter, we consider the impacts of the cost decisions to the provider
revenue, in order to determine the policy a provider should select in order to maximize
their revenues from reservations.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of Provider Revenue
In the previous chapter, we established the system model and the equilibrium states
of the related queuing game. The possible equilibria that can emerge from the game
is determined from the cost to reserve an instance. While C(φ) is defined as the
cost corresponding to the threshold φ, the cost is ultimately set at the choice of
the provider. As with the customers, we assume that the provider in this game is a
rational player and will set the cost to maximize their own benefit. Thus, the provider
can utilize the function C(φ) in order to choose a fee C that will result in a certain
threshold being reached. In particular, the provider is able to utilize this in order to
choose C such that they maximize the revenue collected.
In Section 4.1 we derive the general formula for the revenue associated with a
threshold φ. Using this formula, we define expressions for the maximum revenue and
the maximum guaranteed revenue. We define the latter as the cost that leads to the
maximum revenue could occur in a region with multiple equilibrium state possibilities.
In particular, for the cost functions derived in the previous chapter, regions containing
multiple equilibrium will always contain at least one some− reserve and one none−
reserve. Thus, the maximum guaranteed revenue is the maximum revenue obtainable
by setting the cost such that it corresponds to a unique equilibrium.
In Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 we define the revenue functions within each of the
preemption policies. We show that for all policies, the revenue functions are either
unimodal with a unique maximum, or monotone decreasing. In this manner, we have
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a unique definition for the maximum revenue under each preemption policy. Once
the maximum revenue is defined, we use this definition to determine the maximum
guaranteed revenue expression(s).
In Section 4.5 we compare the maximum revenues under each policy. We prove
that the HPR policy will always lead to the maximum revenue no matter the values
of ρ or K, and back this up with a numerical analysis. In Section 4.6 we do the same
for the maximum guaranteed revenues under each policy. We use a numerical analysis
to show that the HPR policy again leads to the greatest amount of revenue collected
even under the restriction of setting the cost to correspond to a unique equilibrium.
4.1 Definition of Revenue Formulas
In order to perform the analysis, we first define how to derive a function representing
the provider revenues. In the simplest terms, the revenue collected by the provider
will be the number of customers purchasing reservations multiplied by the cost of
purchase. However, the number of customers in our game is a stochastic element.
While we do not know the total number of customers making reservations, we do
know the proportion of customers choosing to make a reservation since the cost is set
in such a manner that a threshold φ ∈ [0, 1] is achieved. The fraction of customers
purchasing reservations is defined in terms of this threshold. Thus, can frame the
revenue in terms of the expected revenue per time unit. This allows for consistent
comparisons across policies as well as yield a definition that does not depend on the
actual number of customers arriving.
Let C(φ) be the general cost function, representing the cost to purchase a reserva-
tion which leads to a threshold of φ. If φ is the threshold, then 1−φ is the proportion
of customers purchasing reservations based upon the definition of our game as stated
in Section 3.1. As λ is the average rate of arrival of customers to the service queue,
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the expected revenue per time unit R(φ) is defined as1:
λ(1− φ)C(φ). (4.1)
From the definition in equation (4.1), we are able to establish concrete definitions
for the revenue intake under each preemption policy. In particular, we are interested
in establishing the maximum revenue a provider can receive for a given service load,
service time distribution, and preemption policy in place.




Note that there is no guarantee that the resulting maximum is in a region with
a single equilibrium. As seen in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, depending on the service
load and preemption policy in place, there exist regions where multiple equilibria are
possible. In particular, within these regions there exist at least one some − reserve
equilibrium and a none− reserve equilibrium.
This is a potential issue for the provider. Per (Smith and Price, 1973) and (Hassin
and Haviv, 2003, p. 81), a situation in which multiple equilibria are present creates
the possibility of one or more of the equilibria being unstable. An equilibrium which
is unstable is not guaranteed to be reached. (Hassin and Haviv, 2003, p. 81) and
(Simhon and Starobinski, 2018) contain examples of situations where a threshold
equilibrium corresponding to a mixed strategy is unstable. Conversely, in the same
situations an equilibrium corresponding to a pure strategy is stable.
1That λ is part of the revenue function definition is why we did not normalize the cost functions
with respect to µ in the previous chapter: the result is that we have a λµ term in the revenue function
formulas for each preemption policy, and this value is ρ by definition.
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Per Theorems 6-10, any cost C with multiple associated equilibria includes at least
one some−reserve and a none−reserve. In the context of our game, a some−reserve
equilibrium is a mixed strategy, while a none−reserve is a pure strategy. As a result, a
provider in the situation of the cost leading to the maximum revenue being associated
with multiple equilibria may instead choose to pursue a guaranteed revenue. The
provider is rational, and so seeks to maximize the revenue, but now with the added
constraint that the cost must correspond to a unique equilibrium. From Theorems
6-10, we define the cost constraint in terms of C1.
Definition 7. The maximum guaranteed revenue is defined such that:
R∗∗ =

maxφ∈(0,1) λ(1− φ)C(φ) s.t. C(φ) < C1 if C 6= C1
λC1 if C = C1.
The reason for the split case is related to the special case for HPR queues with
K ≤ 2. Recalling Section 3.4 in these cases, C1 is the minimum cost. Any value of
C > C1 results in either a unique none− reserve equilibrium, or multiple equilibria.
Even if one of the possibilities in a multi equilibrium situation is the all − reserve
equilibrium, which is stable, it is not necessarily the best response to a some−reserve
equilibrium as the none − reserve equilibrium is also possible. Both pure equilibria
result in a FCFS queue with no preemption, but the none− reserve equilibrium does
not require customers to pay C, and all customers have the same priority. Thus, the
best response strategy to the some − reserve equilibrium could end up being the
none− reserve.
Therefore in this case, we have to set the cost to be just below the value of C1.
This results in an all − reserve equilibrium, in which case φ = 0. In any other case,
there exist a range of costs less than C1 which result in a unique some − reserve
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equilibrium, and we are free to simply take the maximum from that range.
With these definitions established, we may now derive the revenue per time unit
for each of the preemption policies, and compare the respective maximum revenue
and maximum guaranteed revenues to establish the preemption policy which is ideal
from the provider’s perspective. We begin with establishing the expressions for the
maximum revenues for each policy.
4.2 Revenue in the NP Policy
In this section, we define the expressions for the revenue in the non preemptive policy.
We begin by deriving the associated revenue function for the NP policy RNP (φ) from
the definition in equation (4.1):
RNP (φ) =
ρ3Kφ(1− φ)
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))2
. (4.2)
In order to define R∗NP and R
∗∗
NP , we first determine the behavior of the function
RNP (φ). As the behavior of CNP (φ) does not depend on the variance in service,
neither will the behavior of RNP (φ), and we assert that the following holds for all
values of K:
Lemma 5. The revenue function RNP (φ) is unimodal for all ρ ∈ (0, 1), with a unique
maximum occurring at φ = 1−ρ
2−ρ .




ρ3K ((1− ρ)− φ(2− ρ))
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))3
. (4.3)
We note that as ρ ∈ (0, 1) and K ≥ 1, the quantities ρ3K, 1−ρ, and (1−ρ(1−φ))3
will always be positive. Therefore the sign of the derivative will be determined by the
sign of (1− ρ)− φ(2− ρ).
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Consider the following:
As φ→ 0, (1− ρ)− φ(2− ρ)→ 1− ρ > 0
As φ→ 1, (1− ρ)− φ(2− ρ)→ 1− ρ− 2 + ρ = −1 < 0.
Thus, the sign of the quantity (1−ρ)−φ(2−ρ) changes in the interval φ ∈ (0, 1).
As the numerator is a linear function in φ, this happens exactly once; specifically
when the following holds:
(1− ρ)− φ(2− ρ) = 0→ φ = 1− ρ
2− ρ
.
Therefore, if φ ∈ (0, 1−ρ
2−ρ), the sign of (1− ρ)− φ(2− ρ), and thus the derivative,
is positive and therefore the function is increasing. If φ ∈ (1−ρ
2−ρ , 1) the sign of the
numerator, and thus the derivative, is negative and therefore the function is decreas-
ing. Therefore, RNP (φ) is unimodal in a stable system, with a global maximum when
φ = 1−ρ
2−ρ .
As the revenue function has a unique maximum, defining the maximum possible
revenue for the NP policy is straightforward.
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the provider must set the cost at just below C1 NP in order to guarantee that a non







Definition 9. The maximum guaranteed revenue in the NP policy is defined as:














We find that in the majority of cases the provider can set the cost to be equal to
the cost leading to R∗NP and be guaranteed that level of revenue.
4.3 Revenue in the PR Policy
In this section, we define the revenue quantities under the preemptive resume policy.
As previously, we begin with establishing the revenue function under this policy:
RPR(φ) =
ρ2Kφ(1− φ)
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))2
. (4.4)
To determine the maximum revenue, we evaluate the increasing/decreasing be-
havior of the function:
Lemma 6. The revenue function RPR(φ) is unimodal for all ρ ∈ (0, 1), with a unique
maximum occurring at φ = 1−ρ
2−ρ .




ρ2K ((1− ρ)− φ(2− ρ))
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))3
. (4.5)
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. As ρ is a constant parameter with respect to φ,
multiplication by ρ does not affect the intervals for which the derivative is positive or
negative. Therefore, the remainder of the proof follows by analogy to Lemma 5.










And Definition 10 follows from Lemma 6. As CNP (φ) = ρCPR(φ) we conclude by
analogy to the NP case that if ρ < 2
3
the associated cost is in a unique some−reserve
region, but otherwise a none − reserve equilibrium is possible. And thus Definition
11 follows.
Definition 11. The maximum guaranteed revenue in the PR policy is defined as
follows: 













The provider’s decision of the trade off between the maximum possible and max-
imum guaranteed revenues will be the same in the PR policy as in the NP policy.
This is expected as the cost functions are a constant multiple of each other.
4.4 Revenue in the HPR Policy
Within the HPR policy, the revenue function RHPR(φ) will be derived as follows:
2ρ(1− ρ)(1− φ)(1− ρ(1− φ)) +Kρ2φ(1− φ)
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))2
− ρ(1− φ). (4.7)
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In order to derive the maximum possible revenue, we must first determine the
behavior of RHPR(φ):




), RHPR(φ) is monotone decreasing.




2(1− φopt)(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φopt))(2− ρ(1− φopt))
1− ρ− φopt(2− ρ)
.
Proof. As we are examining the behavior of RHPR(φ), in particular determining where
the maximum value of the function occurs along the restricted domain φ ∈ [0, 1], we
begin by computing the derivative dRHPR
dφ
:
ρ2 [K (1− ρ− φ(2− ρ))− 2(1− φ)(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))(2− ρ(1− φ))]
2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))3
. (4.8)
We note that ρ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ [0, 1] implies that (1 − ρ)(1 − ρ(1 − φ))3 and ρ2 are
always positive. Thus, the sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the
expression within the square brackets:
K (1− ρ− φ(2− ρ))− 2(1− φ)(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))(2− ρ(1− φ)).
As ρ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ [0, 1] it follows that 1 − ρ, 1 − φ, 1 − ρ(1 − φ), 2 − ρ(1 − φ) are
all non-negative quantities. Ergo,
−2(1− φ)(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))(2− ρ(1− φ))
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will always be a non-positive quantity. However,
K (1− ρ− φ(2− ρ))
is positive if φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) and is non-positive otherwise, for any ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) is necessary for the derivative to be positive, but the condition
is not sufficient. Whether the numerator of the derivative will ever be positive for
such φ also depends on the value of K as we are adding together a positive and a
non positive quantity. Therefore, we determine the condition on K for which the
numerator (and thus the entire derivative) is positive, yielding the following:
K >
2(1− φ)(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))(2− ρ(1− φ))
1− ρ− φ(2− ρ)
. (4.9)
We claim that as a result of the condition on φ and the condition on K we have two
cases: one where the derivative is always negative implying the function is monotone
decreasing, and one where the derivative transitions from being positive to negative
exactly once, implying the function is unimodal with a unique maximum.
We show that these are the only two cases by claiming the following: given φ ∈
[0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) and a fixed ρ, the right hand side of (4.9) is a monotone increasing function
in φ. To show this, we compute the derivative of the expression with respect to φ,
yielding the following:
4(1− ρ) [1− 3(1− φ)φρ− 2(1− φ)3ρ2 + (1− φ)3ρ3]
(1− ρ− φ(2− ρ))2
.
We claim that this is always positive for φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ), ρ ∈ (0, 1). Clearly the
denominator is either positive or 0 as it is a square term. As the value of φ which
makes the denominator 0 is 1−ρ
2−ρ , which is excluded from the domain, the denominator
is always positive and the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the numerator.
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In the numerator, as ρ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that 4(1−ρ) > 0. Thus for the numerator
to be positive, the sum of the terms in the square brackets must be positive. For this
to be the case, the following must hold:
1 > 3(1− φ)φρ+ ρ2(1− φ)3(2− ρ).
As ρ ∈ (0, 1), clearly as ρ approaches 0 this holds. However, as ρ approaches 1,
because φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ), φ in such a situation will be approximately 0, in which case the
in equality reduces to
1 > ρ2(2− ρ),
and since ρ < 1, this still holds. Therefore, the derivative of the expression on the
right hand side of (4.9) is positive for all ρ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ), as the larger ρ
gets, the more restricted φ becomes and thus the condition on the numerator being
positive cannot be violated. As a result, the expression on the right hand side of (4.9)
is monotone increasing in φ on the restricted domain.
As K ≥ 1 and finite and ρ ∈ (0, 1), this means that we have the following possi-
bilities:
1. (4.9) is not satisfied for any φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ). Therefore, the derivative of RHPR(φ)
is negative for all φ ∈ [0, 1], and therefore RHPR(φ) is monotone decreasing.
2. (4.9) is satisfied for some φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) but not all. Therefore, there is some
φopt ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) for which (4.9) flips from being true to false. Therefore, the
derivative of RHPR(φ) goes from being positive to negative at φ
opt, and thus
RHPR(φ) is unimodal with a unique maximum at φ
opt.
The possibility of (4.9) being satisfied for all φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) is rendered impossible
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by the fact that the right hand side of (4.9) goes to infinity as φ approaches 1−ρ
2−ρ from
below, and K being finite because it is a variance parameter.
Having established the possible behavior of RHPR(φ), we now define the conditions
under which each can occur, and the resulting φ at which the maximum value occurs.
Case I, Monotone Decreasing: That the function can have monotone decreas-
ing behavior is implied by the fact that we have two conditions in which the numerator
is positive and therefore the entire derivative is positive. For a given K, ρ if both
conditions are never met, the derivative will be always negative for φ ∈ (0, 1), which
in turn implies that the function is monotone decreasing.
As we know that the derivative will be negative if φ ∈ [1−ρ
2−ρ , 1], regardless of the
value of K we are interested in situations where φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) and (4.9) fails to hold.
Which means that the following must be true for fixed K, ρ and all φ in the interval:
K ≤ 2(1− φ)(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ))(2− ρ(1− φ))
1− 2φ− ρ(1− φ)
.
Because the condition fails to hold everywhere, it certainly fails to hold at φ = 0.
Substituting 0 for φ yields
K ≤ 2(1− ρ)(2− ρ).






But the plus condition results in an expression greater than 1, so it can be dis-





this interval is a subset of (0, 1) as long as K ∈ [1, 4). Therefore, we have the condi-
tions for which RHPR(φ) is monotone decreasing. And as it is monotone decreasing,
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the maximum value of the function occurs at φ = 0.
Case II, Unimodal with unique maximum:




] for K ∈ [1, 4). Therefore we
must have a unimodal function with a unique maximum. And this maximum must
occur at φopt such that
K =
2(1− φopt)(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φopt))(2− ρ(1− φopt))
1− ρ− φopt(2− ρ)
.
As this is the point in φ ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) where (4.9) transitions from being true to false.
Solving for φopt yields three solutions, where j is the square root of negative 1 and






























The specific value of φopt such that the solution is both real and in the bound
[0, 1−ρ
2−ρ) depends upon the values of ρ and K. Thus, this is the most general form
possible of the solution, and thus the expression must be evaluated for fixed ρ and K
in order to determine the valid φopt for the specific case.
Thus, the value of R∗HPR will be either R(0) or R(φ
opt) depending on whether the
function is unimodal or monotone decreasing, which in turn depends in part on the
values of ρ and K.




), then RHPR is monotone increasing, thus
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Case II: otherwise, the function is unimodal with a unique maximum. However,
there is an issue, namely that the cubic root equation yields three possible candidates
for φopt, and as the values of K, ρ determine which solutions are in the real domain
at all, let alone in [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ), it is not possible to have a general form of the expression.
Therefore, any solutions must be computed numerically, examples of which follow in
section 4.5.
As before, we consider the possibility that the provider lowers the fee to a level
where they guarantee a revenue stream by having the cost correspond to a region
where one some−reserve or all−reserve equilibrium exists. As the region definitions
depend on the value of K, we break down the analysis into three cases as with the
analysis of the cost function in section 3.4.
4.4.1 Systems with Low Variance of Service
In computing the guaranteed revenue in this case, we note from Theorem 8 that
the only single equilibrium region that is not an none − reserve equilibrium is the
all − reserve equilibrium where C < CHPR. As such per Definition 7 for K < 2,





4.4.2 Systems with Exponential Service Distribution
As in the low variance case, we note from Theorem 9 that a all− reserve equilibrium
such that C < CHPR is the only possible single equilibrium case. Therefore, for an
M |M |1 queue R∗∗ will be defined as in Equation (4.10) as CHPR = C1 HPR in this
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case as well.
4.4.3 Systems with High Variance of Service
Unlike the previous two cases, if K > 2, then there does exist a region where the
some− reserve equilibrium is a unique equilibrium possibility.




]. In this case, the maximum
revenue occurs at φ = 0, which will always be a unique equilibrium per Theorem 10.
Therefore for such K, ρ, R∗∗HPR = R
∗
HPR.
Case II: otherwise, as in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we have to test whether the resulting
maximum is associated to a unique some−reserve equilibrium. This requires solving
the inequality C(φopt) < C1 HPR. We do not have an explicit form of φ
opt. However,
it is possible to solve the inequality to determine a definition for R∗∗HPR if C(φ
opt) >
C1 HPR is in fact the case.
In order to determine the φ leading to the maximum guaranteed revenue, let




2(1− ρ)(1− ρ(1− φ)) +Kρφ







We note that both sides have are a multiple of 1
µ
, so these terms cancel and µ is
not important. Solving for φ, we have the following solution φguar:
(K − 2)(ρ− 1)2
ρ(2 + ρ(K − 2))
. (4.11)
As CHPR is either unimodal or monotone increasing, we conclude that, if φ
opt ≤





guar). The question is then
whether it is possible to define the conditions on which we know where φopt leads to
a guaranteed maximum, or if the provider must set the price at a level corresponding
to the φguar threshold.
84
While we do not have an explicit, simplified general form of φopt, we do know that
φopt must be less than 1−ρ
2−ρ . Given K > 2, we find that
1−ρ
2−ρ < φ
guar for ρ ∈ (0, 2K−4
3K−4).











have the following sub cases in which the maximum possible revenue is guaranteed:













and ρ ∈ (0, 2K−4
3K−4).
If neither of these hold, C(φopt) must be explicitly computed. If it is the case that
C(φopt) > C1 HPR, then R
∗∗






Otherwise R∗∗HPR will still equal R
∗
HPR.
4.5 Comparison of Maximum Revenues Across Policies
Now that the expressions for the maximum revenues per policy have been defined,
we can now address the question of which policy a provider should select in order to
maximize the revenue they receive from reservation purchases.
We begin by noting that per the Definitions 8 and 10, R∗NP = ρR
∗
PR. Since
we assume the system is stable, ρ < 1 follows. Therefore R∗NP < R
∗
PR, and the
preemptive resume policy will always yield greater revenue than the non preemptive
policy. Because the provider is always better off choosing PR over NP, the question
of which policy yields optimal revenue reduces to a comparison of the maximum
revenues possible in the HPR policy compared to the PR policy.




Proof. The value of R∗PR is the same for all K, but the value of R
∗
HPR depends on the
values of K, ρ as seen in Sections 4.3, 4.4. Therefore, we have two cases to consider:
where R∗HPR is monotonically decreasing, or where it is unimodal.




). Then R∗HPR is monotonically









R∗HPR being greater than R
∗
PR depends on the following holding:
8(1− ρ) > K.

























holds, then the assertion R∗HPR > R
∗
PR is true for the given ρ,K. We note that the
last inequality simplifies to
24K > K2.
And as K < 4, it follows that in this case, R∗HPR will indeed be the greater value.
Case II: otherwise, consider the case where RHPR is unimodal, in which case we
do not have a general explicit form for R∗HPR, as there are three possible solutions to
86
φopt, and the one which is real valued depends on the specific values of ρ and K.
Recall from section 3.4 that CHPR(φ) > CPR(φ) for any given φ, ρ, and K.
Further, by definition R(φ) = λ(1 − φ)C(φ). Therefore, for a fixed φ, ρ, and K, it













R∗PR follows for any given ρ and K.
This result is reinforced by the plot in figure 4·1. This figure is generated by
computing R∗HPR and R
∗
PR for K ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 50}, and ρ ∈ {.01, .03, .05, ..., .99} in
MATLAB. In the case of unimodal RHPR(φ), we solve for φ
opt numerically and choose
the solution which is within the bound φopt ∈ [0, 1−ρ
2−ρ). We then plot the difference
R∗HPR −R∗PR. If this difference is greater than 0, then R∗HPR must be larger.
Inspecting the figure shows that this is indeed the case. And evaluating whether
the entries matrix of revenue differences R∗HPR−R∗PR are greater than 0 returns true
for all entries, reinforcing the result from the figure. Therefore, we can conclude with
a high degree of certainty that R∗HPR > R
∗
PR is the case in general. We conclude this
section by presenting tables for K ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and selected values of ρ between
0.1 and 0.9. to provide examples of the comparisons in numerical format. Values are
rounded to four decimal places. As expected, we find that R∗HPR will be larger than
R∗PR within each of the specific cases.
4.6 Comparison of Maximum Guaranteed Revenues Across
Policies
Of course, a provider may instead be focused on securing a guaranteed revenue level
rather than risk entering a situation where no revenue is received from reservations.
Thus, we consider the preemption policy under which a more conservative provider
will maximize their revenue. We again note that per Definitions 9 and 11 that R∗∗NP =
ρR∗∗PR. As ρ < 1 we conclude that a provider is better off choosing PR over NP even
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Figure 4·1: Surface plot of R∗HPR−R∗PR for ρ ∈ (0, 1), and K ∈ [1, 50].
We find that the difference is positive for all of the values of ρ,K we
computed the plot over, as evidenced by the uniform coloring over
the entire surface and the fact that the z-axis only contains positive
numbers. From this, we can interpolate that R∗HPR will be larger than
R∗PR in general, as expected.
if adopting a more conservative approach. Therefore, as in the previous section, we
focus our revenue comparisons on the PR and HPR policies.
However, from the results in sections 4.3 and 4.4 we have multiple cases to consider
in determining the values of the guaranteed revenue quantities, based upon the regions
in which the maximum revenue corresponds to a threshold with a unique equilibrium.
Table 4.2 outlines each case by the values of K and ρ.
Case IA: K ≤ 2 and ρ ≤ 2
3
Here, while R∗∗HPR does not depend on the value of ρ since K ≤ 2 means that
the only region containing a unique equilibrium where customers reserve is the all−
88
Table 4.1: Comparison of the numerical results for R∗PR and R
∗
HPR
for K = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and ρ varying between 0.1 and 0.9. We find that















































































reserve region below the value of C1 HPR, R
∗∗
PR does depend on ρ. For ρ ≤ 23 , R
∗∗
PR is








Determining whether R∗∗HPR > R
∗∗
PR holds reduces to determining if the following is
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Table 4.2: Definitions of the cases to consider for the values of R∗∗HPR
and R∗∗PR. Note that some cases do not have explict determinations for
R∗∗HPR due to not having an explicitly defined φ
opt.
K ρ R∗∗PR R
∗∗
HPR
≤ 2 ≤ 2
3
R∗PR λC1 HPR

















































































true for ρ ∈ (0, 2
3
]:
4(1− ρ) > 1.
Clearly it holds for ρ near 0 and ρ = 2
3
, and as the condition is linear in ρ it will hold
for all ρ in the interval, thus R∗∗HPR > R
∗∗
PR in this case.
Case IB: K ≤ 2 and ρ ≤ 2
3
In this case, R∗∗HPR remains the same but R
∗∗













By inspection, R∗∗HPR > R
∗∗
PR holding depends on the values of the numerators, as the
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denominators are identical. Thus, this reduces to determining whether
ρ2 > 2ρ− 1
will hold for ρ ∈ (2
3
, 1). This is equivalent to solving the inequality
(ρ− 1)2 > 0
which is trivially true. Therefore R∗∗HPR > R
∗∗
PR holds for any ρ and K ∈ [1, 2]. This is
reinforced via comparisons of the numerical outputs as seen in table 4.3 for K = 1, 2
and ρ being set to specified values between 0.1 and 0.9. Outputs have been rounded
to four decimal places
Table 4.3: Numerical results for R∗∗ under the PR and HPR policies
for K = 1, 2. We find that R∗∗HPR is the greater value for all ρ and























































default, as we already demonstrated in section 4.5 that R∗HPR > R
∗
PR for all ρ, K.












Here, R∗∗PR = R
∗





, RHPR(φ) is known to
be unimodal. While we can derive an explicit expression for RHPR(φ
guar), what we
do not know is whether the maximum revenue is guaranteed or not. Therefore, we
must solve this numerically, which we delay to the end of the section.




) and ρ > 2
3





. As we have the same issue with determining ex-
plicitly whether the maximum revenue is guaranteed or not, we defer this analysis to
a numerical comparison.




and ρ ≤ 2−4K
3−4K
As with Case IIA, we know for certain the maximum revenue is guaranteed for
both policies. Therefore, R∗∗HPR > R
∗∗
PR automatically.













and ρ > 2
3
have the same issues as the analogous IIB, IIC with
respect to the lack of an explicit closed form R∗∗HPR. With φ
opt requiring knowledge of
ρ,K to determine the valid solution, this has to be analyzed on a case by case basis.
Thus, to show that R∗∗HPR > R
∗∗
PR will be hold in general, we perform a numerical
analysis similar to the comparison of the maximum revenues. Figure 4·2 contains a
sample plot of R∗∗HPR−R∗∗PR for K ∈ [2, 51] and ρ ∈ (0, 1). We find while the difference
is greatest at about ρ = 0.6 and are small for low or high values of ρ, the difference in
the guaranteed maximum values is positive for all ρ and K sampled. Testing whether
the matrix of differences is larger than 0 returns true for all ρ and K, confirming
the result. Therefore, we assert that R∗∗HPR > R
∗∗
PR is true in general based on the
numerical evidence.
We conclude the section by presenting numerical results for K ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6} and
ρ between 0.1 and 0.9 for the guaranteed revenue values. The results are contained
within table 4.4.
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Figure 4·2: Surface plots ofR∗∗HPR−R∗∗PR for ρ ∈ (0, 1), andK ∈ [2, 51].
We find that the difference is positive for all of the values of ρ,K we
computed the plot over, as noted by the z-axis only containing positive
numbers. While there are fluctuations in the difference based on the
values of ρ and K, at no point is the difference ever less than 0.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we define revenue functions for each preemption policy, and compare
the policies to determine the one a rational provider should adopt to achieve the
maximum revenue possible. We prove that the HPR policy will lead to the greatest
revenues to the provider, and use a numerical analysis to back up this result. This
holds even though a simplified expression for the optimal revenue under the HPR
policy does not exist.
In addition, we consider revenue maximization under the constraint that the
provider guarantees their revenue collected from reservations. We find again that
the HPR preemption policy is the one that a rational provider should choose to max-
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Table 4.4: Numerical results for R∗∗ under the PR and HPR policies
for K = 3, 4, 5, 6. We find that R∗∗HPR is the greater value for all ρ and





















































imize their revenue. While this lacks a formal proof in general, we are able to show
this explicitly for some basic cases, and otherwise are able to conjecture this holds in




In this chapter, we summarize the results from the previous chapters and give indi-
cations as to future research directions that can be built off of our results.
In Chapter 2, we reviewed related work in the areas of queuing games, preemp-
tion based systems, and pricing within cloud computing ecosystems. We highlighted
how this work’s contributions differ from the other works. In particular, our model
accounts for differences in the provider’s preemption policies.
In Chapter 3, we explicitly defined our model and proved that under our assump-
tions the only equilibrium type that is possible is a threshold equilibrium. Based on
this result, we were able to define a cost C(φ) for each policy in terms of the thresh-
old. Within each policy, we defined the equilibria types associated to cost ranges
determined by the minimum and maximum values of the function. We ultimately
proved that the hybrid preemptive/non preemptive policy led to the largest value of
C(φ) for fixed values of ρ, K, and φ. In addition, we proved that an all − reserve
equilibrium is only possible if the HPR policy is in effect.
In Chapter 4, we derived a revenue function for each policy, comparing the max-
imum and maximum guaranteed revenues. We proved that the maximum revenue
is obtained for a given ρ and K under the HPR policy. In addition, we showed nu-
merically that the maximum guaranteed revenue will be obtained under the HPR
policy.
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5.1 Summary of Results
In Chapter 3, we developed our model and analyzed the possible equilibrium pos-
sibilities based on the customer decision to make a reservation for a given provider
cost. We use an M |G|1 with priorities to model the customer arrivals and service.
The desired service start times follow a Poisson process, and the priorities are drawn
from the uniform distribution [0, 1] based on when the customer decides to purchase a
reservation. Customers may pay C to purchased a reserved instance and be assigned
the priority originally offered by the provider. Otherwise, the customer may opt for a
non reserved instance at the cost of automatically being assigned the lowest priority.
However, such customers will not pay C.
The reservation decision is based on whether the cost of C plus the cost of waiting
with the offered priority is less than the cost of waiting with the lowest priority. Under
the assumptions of our model, the key finding is that the only possible equilibrium
state is a threshold equilibrium: all customers above some threshold φ ∈ [0, 1] will
purchase a reserved instance, all others will not. This enables the provider to predict
their expected revenue based upon the cost and the proportion of customers who will
purchase a reservation at that price. It also enables a definition of the cost leading
to a threshold φ in terms of the differences in wait times of customers.
Under our model, providers are free to set the cost at whatever level they please.
Additionally, the provider chooses the preemption policy that applies to customers
based on their purchased priority. Providers may implement a non preemptive (NP)
queue, where all customers will complete service uninterrupted. Alternatively, a
provider may opt to implement a preemptive resume (PR) queue, where any cus-
tomer is subject to preemption while in service based upon priority. However in
order to drive the value of reservations, providers instead may implement a hybrid of
the two policies, and only subject customers without reservations to preemption. We
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refer to this last policy as an HPR policy.
In applying our model within the NP and PR polices, we prove that the equilib-
rium possibilities depend only on the value of the service load ρ, regardless of the
distribution of the service times. In particular, we show that if ρ ≤ 1
2
, the cost func-
tion is monotonically increasing with respect to φ and can be divided into regions
of unique some − reserve equilibria, and none − reserve equilibria. Otherwise, the
cost function is unimodal with respect to φ, with an additional region where two
some − reserve and one none − reserve equilibria exist for the same cost. In ad-
dition, we find that the cost functions associated with the NP and PR policies are
related by a multiplicative constant.
In contrast we prove that the behavior of the cost function of the HPR policy
also depends on the second moment of service, as represented by the parameter K.
The existence of a region containing a unique some − reserve equilibrium depends
on the variance of the service times. However, we also prove that an all − reserve
equilibrium is possible under the HPR policy. This is due in large part to the fact
that by purchasing a reserved instance, a customer cannot be preempted while in
service. This in turn results in a larger incentive to make a reservation than would
exist for a customer in an NP or PR queue. In general, for a fixed service load ρ and
variance parameter K, the cost leading to a given threshold is highest in the HPR
policy.
In Chapter 4, we examine how the provider revenue is impacted by the various
preemption policies. As the number of customers is stochastic, we define revenue
in terms of the expected revenue per time unit corresponding to the threshold φ.
We then derive revenue functions under each preemption policy, and compare the
maximum possible revenue that can be obtained under each policy. We prove that
the HPR policy leads to the maximum possible revenue regardless of the values of
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φ and K. Therefore a rational provider should choose this policy to maximize the
revenues they collect from reservation.
However, the cost that leads to the maximum revenue under each policy may
be in a region where there exist multiple equilibria corresponding to this cost. If
multiple equilibria are associated to the cost, then the specific equilibrium leading
to the maximum revenue is not necessarily stable. In fact, in general it will not be
unless it is an all−reserve equilibrium. As a result, the provider may decide to trade
off not obtaining the maximum revenue possible in favor of guaranteeing a revenue
stream. Such an action prevents the provider from encountering a situation where no
revenue is collected from reservations.
Even in the case where the provider opts to maximize a guaranteed revenue, the
provider still is best off choosing an HPR policy. While we cannot prove this explicitly
in general, we show through numerical analyses that the difference in maximum guar-
anteed revenue in the HPR and PR policies is positive for ρ ∈ (0, 1), and K ∈ [2, 51].
In addition, this is provable in an explicit form for K ≤ 2. Therefore we conjecture
that in general, a provider is best off implementing the HPR policy to maximize their
revenues.
In summary, the results in Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that providers of cloud
services are best off implementing an HPR policy over a NP or PR one. Because of
the added benefit to customers under HPR of a reservation preventing preemption,
customers have added incentive to pay the reservation cost under this model. As a
result, more customers elect to purchase a reservation at a higher cost than can be
charged under NP or PR. As the major cloud service providers operate under similar
principles to those of our model, these results indicate that providers are currently
operating with the most appropriate preemption policy.
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5.2 Future Directions
There are several assumptions that our model makes which can be expanded upon.
For instance, one of our assumptions are that customers are statistically identical.
While it is reasonable to assume this for the virtual machines themselves that cus-
tomers operate on, it may not be the case that all customers value their time equally.
One possible extension of the model then is to consider a game where the value placed
on the time spent waiting may differ for each customer. A customer who places a
higher premium on the wait time for service may be more likely to purchase a reser-
vation at a lower priority. This may result in a differing equilibrium structure, and
the provider strategy would change accordingly if so.
Another assumption is that of the single server queue. While this was done for
reasons of tractability in order to have verifiable formulas, in general a provider of
cloud services will have multiple servers available. While our results do provide insight
into the customer and provider decision, the next iteration is to determine if this holds
at scale. The simulator methodology demonstrated in Chapter 3 can be scaled to run
results for multiple servers. While a general M |G|n wait time formula does not exist,
any simulator which can be shown to be valid under special cases with multiple
servers, such as M |M |2-NP for which a formula is known, can be said to produce
results which can be trusted. A multi-server simulator can then be used to judge the
model against real world situations.
Further, we assume that customers pay the fees for virtual storage as a simplifying
assumption in our model. This is not necessarily the case, however the present of such
virtual storage is what enables customers to experience preemptive resume behavior.
As a result, one possible variation of the model includes the storage fee being optional,
and determining how this price can be set to maximize provider revenues from both
storage and reservations combined. The primary drawback to such an analysis is
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naturally the two separate fees complicates the analysis.
Finally, additional work can be done in determining whether the costs set by the
provider lead to a socially optimal result for the customers as well. The analysis of the
social welfare is straightforward in the NP policy. The sum of the wait times of cus-
tomers across all classes is a constant in any non preemptive discipline (Adan, 2003),
therefore any equilibrium is socially optimal. However, in systems where preemption
is involved, the order in which the customers arrive does matter. In particular, the
difference between the expected residual service of a preempted customer and the
expected service impacts the sum of the total wait times. As a result, the analysis of
the social welfare is by no means trivial.
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Appendix A
Algorithms From Single Server
Simulations
In this Appendix, we present the algorithms corresponding to the simulator programs
from Section 3.5. The program itself is written in Python 3.6, and makes use of version
3 of the SimPy package (SimPy, 2018).
A.1 Global Parameter Definitions
The user specifies the following parameters to be passed in:
• λ - arrival rate
• µ - service rate
• φ - threshold for priorities
• costfile - path to a file to store cost information
The following Global Parameters are hard coded into the simulator itself :
• SIM TIME - length of time to simulate over, set equal to 5∗106
λ
.
• FRAC - fraction of time to wait for before collecting statistics.
• T START - time to start collecting statistics at, set equal to FRAC*SIM TIME.
This parameter serves to prevent collection until the system reaches steady state
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to prevent data from being skewed by events occurring at startup (when the
queue will be empty).
• ITERATIONS - the number of independent simulations to run for the given
λ, µ, φ.
• α - quantity corresponding to confidence interval.
• ε - epsilon of interval for ghost customer priorities.
SIM TIME is defined to scale such that approximately five million customers will
be created in each iteration. The other values are changed as needed, but for the
simulations described in section 3.5, FRAC = 0.1, ITERATIONS = 30, α = 0.05 (as
the confidence interval is defined in terms of 1 − α, and we use a 95% confidence
interval), and ε = 0.0005.
A.2 Main Routine
The primary routine consists of a loop which repeats the simulation ITERATIONS
times and stores the mean costs collected in each simulation run. At each step, the
loop initializes a SimPy Environment and passes it into a custom class called SimEnv
which contains the other routines. the simulation is then run for SIM TIME units.
During each iteration, the total wait times of the ghosts are stored in an array
called w, and the number of ghost customers in an array called n. At the end of the
simulation, these arrays are used to calculate the average wait times for NR and RI
ghost customers. The difference in these averages
After the final simulation, the values in the Cost array are averaged together to
get an overall mean. The values are also used to compute the delta error of the
Confidence interval, where zα is the value computed from the standard distribution
for the given α CI parameter. These values are saved to file.
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Main Simulation Loop
1: Costs← empty 1 by ITERATIONS array
2: for k = 1 : ITERATIONS do
3: env← Simpy Enviornment
4: sim← SimEnv(env)






8: Cmean ← mean(Costs)
9: Cstd ← stddev(Costs)





11: ExportCmean, δerrto costfile
There are then three programs defined within the class itself, for regular customer
arrivals, ghost customer arrivals, and the server. Each of these is slightly modified
between the preemption policies, thus we present each version here. However, the
SimEnv class has parameters common to all types:
• w - a 1 by 2 array of the cumulative wait times of ghost customers.
• n - a 1 by 2 array of the total number of ghost customers.
• idle - a flag to trigger a wake up of the server if no customers are being served.
Initialized as True.
• queue - the priority queue
All three preemption cases contain routines for regular customer arrivals, ghost
customer arrivals, and the server. The differences are in the need to trigger preemption
when necessary.
A.3 Algorithms For NP Simulation
The NP version of the simulation is the most straight forward. Customers are gen-
erated at random intervals, distributed with mean rate λ. The customer is then
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assigned some priority - if it is below the threshold, the priority is updated to 0 to
indicate a non reserved instance. The customer is then added onto the queue.
NP Arrivals
1: while True do
2: Wait some exponential amount of time with mean 1
λ
3: prioirty← U [0, 1]
4: if priority < φ then
5: priority← 0
6: end if
7: Add customer to queue with priority and arrival time equal to now
8: if idle then
9: Wake up the Server
10: end if
11: end while
Ghosts are created similarly, the only differences are that the arrival rate is one
tenth of the regular customer arrivals, and the priority is either φ + ε to denote a
reservation just before the threshold, or 0 to denote a customer who arrived just
after the threshold and did not make a reservation. Each is generated with equal
probability.
NP Ghosts
1: while True do
2: Wait some exponential amount of time with mean 10
λ
3: i← random integer 0 or 1
4: if i = 1 then




9: Add customer to queue with priority and arrival time equal to now
10: if idle then
11: Wake up the Server
12: end if
13: end while
The server first checks to see if any customers are waiting in the queue. If not,
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it idles until receiving the wake up trigger. If there are customers present, the next
customer is grabbed from the queue, which will be the highest priority customer
by the queue definition. If the customer is a ghost and the current time is beyond
T START, we increment the wait time and number of ghosts of that priority in the
appropriate arrays.
If the customer is not a ghost, then we wait for some randomly distributed amount
of time, the distribution depends on which service is being tested, and is updated in
the code itself. This pause simulates the customer being served.
NP Server
1: while True do
2: idle← True
3: if queue is empty then
4: wait for wake up trigger
5: end if
6: Get next customer from queue
7: if Next customer is a Ghost then
8: if Current Time is greater than T START then
9: add wait time to w[priority]








A.4 Algorithms for PR Simulation
The PR case is largely identical to that of the NP case. However, when creating
arrivals because customers can be preempted we instead generate the service time on
arrival and add that to the customer’s attributes as servtime. On adding the customer
to the queue, we test if its priority is greater than the customer currently in service.
If it is, we trigger a preemption signal which is handled by the server.
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PR Arrivals
1: while True do
2: Wait some exponential amount of time with mean 1
λ
3: prioirty← U [0, 1]
4: if priority < φ then
5: priority← 0
6: end if
7: Add customer to queue with priority, an arrival time equal to now, and serv-
time equal to some randomly distributed quantity with mean 1
µ
8: if idle then
9: Wake up the Server




Ghost creation is as before, except that ghosts also preempt any customers of
lower priority currently in service.
PR Ghosts
1: while True do
2: Wait some exponential amount of time with mean 10
λ
3: i← random integer 0 or 1
4: if i = 1 then




9: Add customer to queue with priority and arrival time equal to now
10: if idle then
11: Wake up the Server




The server itself behaves similarly to before, adding ghost statistics to the arrays
and serving real customers who are encountered. Customers are served for the serv-
time calculated on their entry. However, if during this period a Preemption Interrupt
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is received, the customer’s servtime is updated to reflect the time already spent in
service, and the customer is re-added to the queue.
While this method would appear to not be entirely accurate in terms of measuring
ghost customer wait times, since the ghosts in service would hypothetically be subject
to preemption, because of how the ghosts are defined the expected wait time due to
preemption will be the same for both ghost classes. This is because both ghost
customer classes will be preempted by customers of class greater than φ+ ε, and thus
are subject to preemption by the same fraction of customers. Preemption of ghosts
not making a reservation by ghosts who do is expected to occur at a rate of 0 since
it is expected that only one customer can have a specific non-zero priority. Ergo, the
expected wait from preemption cancels out, and we can use the difference in wait to
initial service to measure the differences in wait times.
PR Server
1: while True do
2: idle← True
3: if queue is empty then
4: wait for wake up trigger
5: end if
6: Get next customer from queue
7: if Next customer is a Ghost then
8: if Current Time is greater than T START then
9: add wait time to w[priority]




14: Wait for the customer’s assigned servtime
15: if Preemption Interrupt Triggered then






A.5 Algorithms for HPR Simulation
The Setup for the HPR is similar to that of the PR, with two exceptions. The
first is that an interrupt is only triggered if the customer in service did not make
a reservation, and the newly arriving customer did. The other is related to the
ghost customer measurements. Because RI customers are not preempted and NR
customers are not, the customers experience uneven behavior. However, if NR ghosts
were to actually experience service, they would no longer be ghosts, and would impact
the service times of other customers in the queue. Therefore, we tag a subset of NR
customers as also being ghosts, since they and the ghosts would have the same priority
anyway. We target customers with a priority in the interval (φ − 1
20
, φ) so that the
amount of customers being measured is approximately the same as the number of
ghosts.
HPR Arrivals
1: while True do
2: Wait some exponential amount of time with mean 1
λ
3: prioirty← U [0, 1]
4: if priority ∈ (φ− 1
20
, φ) then
5: Treat this customer as if it were a Ghost
6: end if
7: if priority < φ then
8: priority← 0
9: end if
10: Add customer to queue with priority, an arrival time equal to now, and serv-
time equal to some randomly distributed quantity with mean 1
µ
11: if idle then
12: Wake up the Server




For the ghosts, we only create ghosts who make reservations. As these customers
would not be impacted by preemption, we can drop them as soon as they enter service.
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HPR Ghosts
1: while True do
2: Wait some exponential amount of time with mean 20
λ
3: priority← φ+ ε
4: Add customer to queue with priority and arrival time equal to now
5: if idle then
6: Wake up the Server




The server then behaves as it did in the PR case, except that if a regular customer
is also tagged as a ghost, the w and n arrays are updated accordingly to have wait
times of NR customers to compare with the RI ghosts.
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HPR Server
1: while True do
2: idle← True
3: if queue is empty then
4: wait for wake up trigger
5: end if
6: Get next customer from queue
7: if Next customer is tagged as only a ghost then
8: if Current Time is greater than T START then
9: add wait time to w[priority]




14: Wait for the customer’s assigned servtime
15: if Preemption Interrupt Triggered then
16: update servtime to reflect time spent in service, return customer to
queue
17: end if
18: if Customer was tagged as both a real customer and a Ghost then
19: if Current Time is greater than T START then
20: add wait time to w[priority]
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